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1 Introduction  
1.1 The transfer of players 
The legality of the football transfer system is one of the most enduring and talked-about 
subjects in European Union (EU) sports law. The underlying issue is that football players 
are not treated the same as other workers. Players cannot freely change their employers, or, 
in other words, transfer to another club. Instead, clubs buy and sell players as if they were 
commodities. 
Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) – the worldwide governing body 
for football – does not formally mandate the existence of such a system. However, players 
are almost always employed for a fixed term, and FIFA’s rules provide for serious 
sanctions for unilateral termination of contract without just cause. As a result, players can 
transfer to another club only if they are not bound by a valid contract or if a deal is struck 
between the player’s new and former club. Transfer deals usually involve the new club 
paying a transfer fee to the former club. Furthermore, young players cannot transfer freely 
even if their contract has expired. The new club must still pay compensation for training 
costs to the former club. 
Similar rules are place in other team sports as well.
1
 However, outside the sports sector, 
workers are typically free to terminate their contracts and change employers as long as they 
pay for any damages they cause in doing so.
2
 FIFA and other football governing bodies 
defend the transfer system on the grounds that sport is special. In particular, they argue that 
the transfer system is needed to maintain competitive balance between clubs, encourage 
the recruitment and training of young players, and ensure contractual stability. 
The transfer of players is nowadays a big business. European clubs spent 3.868 billion 
euros on transfers in 2014.
3
 The world-record transfer fee is 105 million euros.
4
 These 
figures reflect the size of the European football industry. European clubs generated almost 
16 billion euros of revenue in 2014.
5
 
                                                 
1
 On basketball, see KEA and CDES 2013, pp. 67–78. 
2
 Recording artists are in somewhat similar position as football players. See Terviö 2006, p. 961. 
3
 UEFA 2015b, p. 77. 
4
 BBC 2016. 
5
 UEFA 2015b, p. 40. 
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1.2 EU law and the FIFA transfer system 
The transfer system appears to be at odds with EU free movement and competition law. 
Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) guarantees 
workers the right to free movement, whereas Articles 101 and 102 prohibit anti-
competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. On one hand, players are workers, 
and the transfer system prevents players from freely pursuing gainful employment in other 
Member States. On the other hand, competition between clubs is restricted because clubs 
are prevented from freely acquiring their most important assets – the players. 
The old transfer system was even more restrictive than the current system. Unlike 
nowadays, transfer fees were payable even if the player’s contract had expired. However, 
the old transfer system was brought to an end when the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (ECJ) delivered its judgment in the Bosman
6
 case in 1995. In Bosman, the ECJ ruled 
that out-of-contract transfer fees and nationality quotas in professional football violated 
Article 45 TFEU.  
Initially, FIFA and Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA) – the 
European governing body for football – refused to abide by the ruling.  In response, the 
European Commission launched an investigation into whether the transfer system infringed 
Article 101 TFEU. Eventually, the Commission, UEFA, and FIFA were able to come to an 
agreement on how to revise the transfer system. Fédération Internationale des 
Associations de Footballeurs Professionnels (FIFPro) – the worldwide representative 
organization for professional football players – objected at first but was later brought into 
the fold. Thus, the Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP) entered into 
force in September 2001.
7
 The new rules introduced many changes, but, for the purpose of 
this thesis, it suffices to note that out-of-contract transfer fees were replaced with rules on 
contractual stability and training compensation.
8
 
Today, the transfer system is under fire yet again. Fourteen years after the adoption of the 
RSTP, FIFPro announced in September 2015 that it has lodged a complaint with the 
Commission concerning the transfer system. FIFPro argues that the transfer system 
                                                 
6
 Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL and others v Bosman and 
others EU:C:1995:463 (Bosman). 
7
 Parrish 2003, pp. 139–149. 
8
 For a list of changes, see Commission Press Release IP/02/824, “Commission Closes Investigations into 
FIFA Regulations on International Football Transfers,” 5 June 2002. 
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infringes Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In particular, FIFPro takes issue with Articles 17 and 
18(3) RSTP. The former provides for compensation and sporting sanctions in case of 
unilateral termination of contract without just cause, whereas the latter prohibits players 
from singing a new contract before their old contract has expired or is due to expire within 
six months.
9
 
FIFPro’s complaint will not necessarily result in the Commission adopting a formal 
decision. First, the Commission may reject the complaint on the grounds that it does not 
display sufficient Community interest to justify an investigation.
10
 Second, if the 
Commission finds merit in the complaint, it will likely try to negotiate with the parties in 
order to revise the transfer system once again.
11
 On the other hand, if the complaint proves 
unsuccessful, FIFPro could try to press the issue by taking the matter to national courts or 
competition authorities.
12
 
Finally, it is worth noting that transfer fees would probably still exist in some form even if 
Article 17 RSTP were to be abolished. Clubs would often want to buy out a player’s 
contract in order to avoid litigation. Moreover, the sum of money paid as a transfer fee 
might very well be higher than what would have been awarded as damages in a court of 
law.
13
 Nevertheless, in comparison to the current system, the player and the new club 
would be in a much stronger position. After all, the player could always just transfer 
anyway and deal with the consequences later. 
1.3 Research question 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the legality of FIFA’s transfer rules in so far as 
they require the payment of a sum of money when a player transfers. To be more specific, 
my research question is as follows: Are FIFA’s rules on contractual stability (Article 17 
RSTP) and training compensation (Article 20 RSTP) compatible with EU free movement 
and competition law? 
This thesis focuses on FIFA’s transfer rules, which apply only to international transfers, 
that is to say transfers between clubs of two different national associations. National 
                                                 
9
 FIFPro 2015, pp. 1–2. 
10
 Commission Notice on the Handling of Complaints by the Commission Under Articles 81 and 82 of the 
EC Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/65, paras. 41–45. 
11
 Duval 2016, pp. 110–113. 
12
 Duval 2015b. 
13
 Gardiner and Welch 2007, p. 3. 
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football associations have their own transfer rules as well. These national transfer rules will 
be discussed only when it is necessary for the purpose of assessing FIFA’s rules. 
The RSTP contains many provisions that could perhaps infringe EU law such as the 
previously mentioned Article 18(3) RSTP. However, these provisions will not be 
addressed because they do not directly require the payment of a sum of money when a 
player transfers. 
There is one other provision that is closely related to Articles 17 and 20 RSTP. Article 21 
RSTP provides for a solidarity mechanism that applies when a player transfers while under 
contract. 5% of any compensation paid (not including training compensation) shall be 
distributed between all the clubs that contributed to the player’s training.14 Article 21 
RSTP is obviously not immune to challenge under EU law, but it is much less problematic 
than Articles 17 and 20 RSTP.
15
 Therefore, due the limited length of this study, the 
solidarity mechanism will not be addressed.  
FIFA’s rules will be examined under both free movement and competition law. Only 
taking into account one or the other would not give a complete picture. In general, certain 
practices may be prohibited by free movement law but not by competition law and vice 
versa. Furthermore, many EU sports law commentators are of the opinion that free 
movement and competition law should be applied in a convergent manner.
16
  
It must also be pointed out that this thesis examines FIFA’s transfer rules in the context of 
men’s professional football.17 Because of the different economic realities, some of this 
thesis’ findings might not apply in the context of women’s football. Moreover, Article 20 
RSTP does not even apply to the transfer of female players. The FIFA Dispute Resolution 
Chamber (DRC) noted that the application of Article 20 RSTP as such could actually 
hinder the development of women’s football.18 
                                                 
14
 Annex 5 RSTP. 
15
 For an analysis of Article 21 RSTP, see Halgreen 2013, pp. 222–225. 
16
 Pijetlovic 2015, pp. 215–216; Weatherill 2014, pp. 386–387. 
17
 This is also the reason why male pronouns are used when referring to players. 
18
 DRC Decision No. 411375, 7 April 2011, paras. 12–18. 
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1.4 Method and disposition 
The method of this thesis is doctrinal. In other words, the purpose is to interpret and 
systematize valid law.
19
 In particular, this thesis will not only examine the legality of 
FIFA’s transfer rules under EU law but will also systematize case law in order to construe 
a convergent approach to sport. 
In addition, this thesis utilizes economic studies in order to determine what effects the 
contested rules have on football. However, this does not mean that the law and economics 
method is used. Free movement and competition law ultimately ask whether the measure 
under review is proportionate, and proportionality is related to economic efficiency.
20
 
Accordingly, this thesis does not seek to conduct an economic analysis of the law, but the 
law itself requires economic analysis. 
In addition to the introduction (Chapter 1) and the conclusion (Chapter 7), this thesis 
contains five main chapters. Chapter 2 briefly explores the relationship between sport and 
the EU, whereas Chapter 3 introduces the basic frameworks of the three relevant Treaty 
provisions: Articles 45, 101, and 102 TFEU. Chapter 4 seeks to construe a convergent 
approach to sport under both free movement and competition law, and Chapter 5 examines 
FIFA’s transfer rules in more detail and analyzes what economic effects they have. The 
most important part of this thesis is Chapter 6. First, it will be examined whether the 
contested rules constitute restrictions within the meaning of free movement and 
competition law. Second, it will be discussed whether the rules can be justified under the 
convergent approach outlined in Chapter 4. 
2 Sport and the EU 
2.1 The EU’s competence in the sports sector 
The EU has only the competences that have been conferred upon it in the Treaties. For a 
long time, there was no mention of sport in the Treaties, and, even today, the Treaties do 
not grant the EU any sport-specific legislative powers. Nonetheless, free movement and 
competition law apply to all economic activity, and sport often constitutes an economic 
                                                 
19
 On the doctrinal method, see Peczenik 2001. 
20
 Portuese 2013, especially pp. 623–630. 
 6 
 
activity. Therefore, while the EU generally cannot dictate how sport should be organized, it 
can prohibit certain rules and practices.
21
  
This conclusion was reached in 1974 in Walrave – the first ever sports case brought before 
the ECJ. The case involved nationality restrictions in international motor-paced cycling 
championships. The ECJ noted that “the practice of sport is subject to Community law 
only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity.”22 All the same, the contested 
nationality rules did not infringe free movement law since the prohibition against 
nationality discrimination “does not affect the composition of sport teams, in particular 
national teams, the formation of which is a question of purely sporting interest and as such 
has nothing to do with economic activity.”23  
This arguably poorly worded reference to purely sporting rules caused much confusion 
over the years. Sporting bodies argued that purely sporting rules fall completely outside the 
scope of EU law. However, while purely sporting rules are perhaps based on non-
economic motives, they are not completely unrelated to economic activity. For example, 
participation in international championships provides exposure and can thereby improve a 
sportsperson’s earning potential.24 
This issue was resolved over 30 years later in 2006 in Meca-Medina. Two swimmers 
invoked Articles 101 and 102 TFEU after being banned for doping. At first, the General 
Court (GC) ruled that anti-doping rules were purely sporting rules and, therefore, outside 
the scope of EU law.
25
 While the ECJ also ruled against the swimmers, it disagreed with 
the GC’s reasoning and said that “the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does 
not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the 
activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down.”26 
All in all, it is nowadays clear that there is no general sporting exception and that economic 
sporting activity is subject to EU law. Nevertheless, restrictive sporting rules can be 
justified. As a result, sporting bodies enjoy a conditional autonomy of sorts. They are free 
to adopt whatever rules they want as long as they are able demonstrate that those rules are 
                                                 
21
 Weatherill 2014, p. 2 
22
 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale and others EU:C:1974:140 
(Walrave), para. 4. 
23
 Ibid., para. 8. 
24
 Weatherill 2014, pp. 3–4. 
25
 Case T-313/02 Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commision EU:T:2004:282, para. 47. 
26
 Case C-519/04 Meca-Medina and Majcen v Commision EU:C:2006:492 (Meca-Medina), para. 27. 
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justified in light of the special characteristics of sport.
27
 It is worth noting that this does not 
make sport particularly unique since each industry has its own specificities that must be 
taken into account. Sport just happens to be more peculiar than other industries.
28
 
2.2 Article 165 TFEU 
Sport was introduced to the Treaties in 2009 when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. 
Article 165 TFEU allows the EU to take supporting action in the field of sport. 
Accordingly, the EU now has a clear legal basis upon which to base its sport-related 
programs.
29
 Article 165 TFEU expressly precludes the possibility of harmonization, but the 
EU can still adopt harmonizing measures as long as it can rely on other Treaty 
competencies.
30
   
Article 165 TFEU also provides that the EU shall take into account “the specific nature of 
sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.” So 
far, this paragraph has not heralded any significant changes in the EU’s approach to sport 
and is not likely to do so in the future either. The specific nature of sport has been taken 
into account ever since Walrave. Thus, Article 165 TFEU mostly just gives the established 
practice a Treaty status. However, previously existing arguments may have gained some 
additional weight.
31
   
2.3 The special characteristics of sport 
The notion that sport is somehow special is a recurring and important theme in EU sports 
law.
32
 First of all, it is paramount to acknowledge that team sports are based on mutual 
interdependence. In principle, companies typically want to drive all competitors out of 
business. However, sports teams need opponents. Moreover, teams need credible 
opponents since sport is not very exciting if the same team always wins.
33
 In fact, evidence 
suggests that sport is more profitable if the outcome is uncertain.
34
 Accordingly, there must 
                                                 
27
 Commission White Paper on Sport, COM(2007) 391 Final, 11 July 2007 (White Paper on Sport), pp. 13–
14; Weatherill 2014, pp. 4–6. 
28
 Pijetlovic 2015, p. 32. 
29
 Parrish and others 2010, p. 45. 
30
 Ibid., p. 26. 
31
 Ibid., pp. 27–28 
32
 For more on the special characteristics of sport, see Parrish and Miettinen 2008, pp. 2–19. 
33
 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 
34
 See for example Buraimo and Simmons 2008, especially pp. 153–154. It appears that uncertainty of 
outcome decreases stadium attendance but increases TV audience. 
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be some degree of competitive balance between teams. Financial solidarity is one 
traditional means of ensuring competitive balance. Redistributing revenue from rich to 
poor teams is a relatively common practice in sports, but similar arrangements would be 
unthinkable in practically any other industry.
35
 
Furthermore, sport has an important social, cultural, and educational function that is 
expressly recognized in Article 165 TFEU. Sport obviously has a positive effect on public 
health but can also be used, among other things, to promote social inclusion and combat 
racism.
36
 In fact, much of the EU’s interest in sport can arguably be traced back to its 
desire to protect this socio-educational function from the commercialization of sport.
37
 
3 EU free movement and competition law 
3.1 Introduction  
This thesis seeks to construe a convergent approach to sport in general and Articles 17 and 
20 RSTP in particular under both free movement and competition law. In order to do so, it 
is first necessary to examine free movement and competition law separate from each other. 
This chapter will therefore briefly introduce the basic frameworks of Articles 45, 101, and 
102 TFEU. 
Free movement and competition law share a common objective: the establishment of an 
internal market in which goods, services, people, and capital move freely across national 
borders. However, the two regimes pursue this common objective through slightly 
different means.
38
 
The four fundamental freedoms (the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital) 
form the core of EU free movement law. In particular, Article 45 TFEU enshrines the 
principle of free movement of workers. Initially, the aim was to abolish nationality 
discrimination, but free movement law has since evolved to advocate freedom of cross-
border trade on a more general level.
39
  
                                                 
35
 Parrish and Miettinen 2008, p. 3. 
36
 Pijetlovic 2015, pp. 35–36. 
37
 Halgreen 2013, pp. 61–63. 
38
 Mortelmans 2001, p. 623. 
39
 On the evolution of free movement law, see Barnard 2013, pp. 13–25. 
 9 
 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the two central rules of EU competition law. Article 101 
TFEU prohibits anti-competitive agreements, whereas Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse 
of dominant position. Nowadays, consumer welfare is arguably the most important goal of 
EU competition law.
40
 To put it as simply as possible, this entails ensuring that consumers 
(and other customers) have access to a wide variety of high quality products and services at 
low prices.
41
 Nonetheless, integrating the markets of the Member States and protecting the 
competitive process are still very important goals as well.
42
 
3.2 Article 45 TFEU: the free movement of workers 
3.2.1 General scope  
First and foremost, only workers can invoke Article 45 TFEU. According to the ECJ’s 
well-established definition, a worker is a person who “performs services for and under the 
direction of another person in return for which he receives remuneration.”43 In addition, the 
activity in question must be “effective and genuine” and not just “purely ancillary and 
marginal.”44  
In contrast, a person who performs services outside any relationship of subordination is 
self-employed.
45
 Self-employed persons can invoke Articles 49 and 56 TFEU, which 
guarantee the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services. Ultimately, 
the distinction between workers and self-employed persons is not terribly important since 
Articles 45, 49, and 56 TFEU are all very similar.
46
 
Moreover, the right to free movement can be invoked only by nationals of the European 
Economic Area (EEA) and Switzerland. The EEA includes the EU and also Norway, 
Iceland, and Liechtenstein.
47
 Likewise, free movement law is applicable only where there 
is an inter-state element. In other words, there has to be past, present, or prospective cross-
                                                 
40
 On consumer welfare, see Daskalova 2015, especially pp. 145–146 and 151–152. 
41
 Ibid., pp. 146–153. 
42
 Lianos 2014, pp. 17–41. 
43
 Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1986:284, para. 17 
44
 Case 53/81 Levin v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:1982:105, para. 15. 
45
 Case C-268/99 Jany and others v Staatssecretaris van Justitie EU:C:2001:616, para. 34. 
46
 Barnard 2013, p. 243. 
47
 However, third-country nationals are not completely without protection. See Rogers and others 2012, pp. 
277-280. 
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border movement.
48
 Consequently, wholly internal and purely hypothetical situations fall 
outside the scope of free movement law.
 49
 
It is also important to note that Article 45 TFEU has not only vertical but also horizontal 
direct effect. The right to free movement can therefore be invoked against Member States 
and private individuals. First, in Walrave, Article 45 TFEU was given limited horizontal 
reach when it was applied to rules that regulate employment in a collective manner.
50
 
Later, in Angonese, Article 45 TFEU was applied to the conduct of a private employer.
51
 
However, it remains to be seen whether Article 45 TFEU has full horizontal reach in cases 
that do not involve discrimination.
52
 
3.2.2 Discrimination and market access 
Article 45 TFEU prohibits all nationality discrimination. Direct discrimination refers to 
differential treatment that is expressly based on nationality. In contrast, indirect 
discrimination refers to differential treatment that is not expressly based on nationality but 
has a discriminatory effect in practice.
53
  
Furthermore, it is nowadays clear that the scope of free movement goes beyond 
discrimination. Even genuinely non-discriminatory measures may restrict free movement. 
According to the so-called market access doctrine, free movement law prohibit all 
measures that prevent or hinder market access, or, in other words, preclude or deter 
someone from exercising their right to free movement.
54
 The seminal case in this context is 
actually Bosman.
55
 
In principle, almost any rule can be construed as having a deterrent effect. Therefore, the 
ECJ has introduced some limitations.
56
 In the context of free movement of goods, the ECJ 
held in Keck that “certain selling arrangements” that affect all traders in the same manner 
                                                 
48
 Nic Shuibhne 2013, p. 155. 
49
 On wholly internal situations, see Case 175/78 The Queen v Saunders EU:C:1979:88, para. 11. On purely 
hypothetical situations, see Case 180/83 Moser v Land Baden-Württemberg EU:C:1984:233, para.18. 
50
 Walrave, paras. 17–19. 
51
 Case C-281/98 Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA EU:C:2000:296, paras. 33–36.  
52
 Nic Shuibhne 2013, pp. 108–110 
53
 Ibid., pp. 198–199. 
54
 For an overview of the market access doctrine, see Snell 2010. 
55
 Bosman, paras. 94-104. 
56
 See Jansson and Kalimo 2014. 
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do not constitute restrictions.
57
 Additionally, in the context of free movement of workers, 
the ECJ ruled in Graf that measures whose effects are too uncertain or indirect cannot be 
regarded as restrictions either.
58
  
3.2.3 Justification based on legitimate objectives 
Restrictions are not automatically unlawful, as they can be justified by legitimate 
objectives. Direct discrimination can be justified only by the express derogations found in 
the Treaties.
59
 In particular, Article 45 TFEU provides for exemptions on the grounds of 
public policy, public health, and public security. In addition, employment in the public 
service is completely excluded from the scope free movement. Indirectly discriminatory 
and non-discriminatory restrictions can also be justified by imperative requirements, of 
which there is no exhaustive list.
60
 In principle, any objective that is compatible with the 
Treaties may be considered an imperative requirement.
61
 However, purely economic 
considerations can never justify a restriction of free movement.
62
 
In recent case law, this traditional distinction between express derogations and imperative 
requirements has become blurred. Nowadays, the ECJ often talks about restrictions and 
obstacles and not about discrimination. Consequently, the ECJ has sometimes relied on the 
imperative requirements doctrine even in cases that clearly involved direct 
discrimination.
63
 
3.2.4 The proportionality test 
Legitimate objectives cannot be pursued by any means or at any cost, and only 
proportionate restrictions are lawful. The proportionality test consists of three parts: 
suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu. The rationale behind the 
                                                 
57
 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Criminal proceedings against Keck and Mithouard EU:C:1993:905, 
paras. 16–17. 
58
 Case C-190/98 Graf v Filzmoser Maschinenbau GmbH EU:C:2000:49, para. 25. 
59
 Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State EU:C:1988:196 (Bond van 
Adverteerders), para. 32. 
60
 The term objective justification is usually used in the context of free movement of workers. However, the 
term imperative requirement will be used in order to avoid confusion with other justification frameworks. 
61
 Case C-464/02 Commission v Denmark EU:C:2005:546, para. 53. For a list of examples, see Barnard 
2013, pp. 529–532. 
62
 In relation to express derogations, see Bond van Adverteerders, para. 34. In relation to imperative 
requirements, see Case C-388/01 Commission v Italy EU:C:2003:30, para. 22. 
63
 Nic Shuibhne 2013, pp. 203–204. 
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proportionality test is to ensure that only the most efficient methods are chosen and that 
different interest are balanced against each other.
64
 
The suitability test requires that there is a causal link between the measure and its 
purported objective. The necessity test requires that there are no less restrictive alternatives 
that could achieve the same results. The proportionality stricto sensu test consists of two 
parts. First, the positive effects of the measure must outweigh its restrictive effects. 
Second, the measure must not have an excessive burden on the affected individual. 
65
 In 
practice, the ECJ is hesitant to conduct the proportionality stricto sensu test and tends to 
find restrictions disproportionate at the necessity stage. It would appear that the ECJ wants 
to avoid making politically sensitive statements about the relative values of different 
interests.
66
 
3.3 Common concepts in competition law 
3.3.1 Undertaking 
First of all, EU competition law applies only to undertakings and, by extension, to 
associations of undertakings in the case of Article 101 TFEU. The notion of undertaking is 
broad and “encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.”67 In particular, “any activity 
consisting in offering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity.”68 An 
association of undertakings can be defined as a collective body that “makes itself 
responsible for representing and defending [its members’] common interests vis-à-vis other 
economic operators, government bodies and the public in general.”69 
                                                 
64
 Harbo 2015, p. 22. 
65
 Ibid., pp. 23-40. 
66
 Ibid., pp. 37-38. For an example of the proportionality stricto sensu test, see Case 302/86 Commission v 
Denmark EU:C:1988:421, para. 21. For an especially illustrative example outside the context of free 
movement, see Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk EU:C:2013:28, paras. 51-
65. 
67
 Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH EU:C:1991:161, para. 21 
68
 Joined Cases C-180/08 to C-184/98 Pavlov and others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten 
EU:C:2000:428, para. 75. 
69
 Opinion of AG Léger in Case C-309/99 Wouters and others v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde 
van Advocaten, intervener: Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap EU:C:2001:390, para. 61. 
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3.3.2 Effect on trade 
In addition, EU competition law applies only where there is an effect on trade between 
Member States. The notion of trade is not limited to the traditional exchange of goods and 
services and, instead, covers all economic activity, including establishment.
70
 The effect on 
trade may be even only potential or indirect as long as it is sufficiently probable.
71
  
However, according to the de minimis rule, the effect on inter-State trade must be 
appreciable.
72
 In other words, EU competition law is not concerned with anti-competitive 
conduct that “has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak 
position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question.”73 
3.3.3 The relevant market 
The notion of the relevant market is also of crucial importance, as anti-competitive conduct 
must be assessed in its proper context. The relevant product market consists of all the 
products that are interchangeable from the consumers’ point of view, whereas the relevant 
geographic market comprises the area in which the products are marketed and in which 
conditions are sufficiently homogenous.
74
 In addition, the relevant market may sometimes 
have a temporal element if competitive conditions vary over certain periods of time.
75
 
The relevant market is usually determined by examining demand-side substitution. The 
classic SSNIP
76
 test asks whether customers would switch to other products or suppliers in 
farther away areas in response to a small but significant non-transitory increase in price (5–
10%). If the answer is yes, the products or areas in question are part of the same relevant 
market.
77
  
                                                 
70
 Commission Notice – Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty [2004] OJ C101/81, paras. 19–20. 
71
 Ibid., para. 23. 
72
 Ibid., para. 44. 
73
 Case 5/69 Völk v Etablissements J. Vervaecke SPRL EU:C:1969:35 (Völk), para. 5/7. 
74
 Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purposes of Community Competition 
Law [1997] OJ C372/5 (Relevant Market Notice), paras. 7–8 
75
 Whish and Bailey 2012, pp. 41–42. 
76
 Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price. 
77
 Whish and Bailey 2012, pp. 31–32; Relevant Market Notice, paras. 13–23. 
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3.4 Article 101 TFEU  
3.4.1 Anti-competitive agreements 
Article 101 TFEU consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph prohibits “all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market.” 
The second paragraph renders all prohibited agreements and decisions automatically void, 
and the third paragraph provides for an exemption based on efficiency. 
Article 101 TFEU is intended to apply to all forms of collusion, and no definitive 
distinction is drawn between agreements, decisions, and concerted practices. Hereafter, the 
term agreement will be used as shorthand. The important to thing to remember is that 
Article 101 TFEU applies only to collusion and not to independent conduct.
78
 Agreements 
can be either horizontal (between undertakings at the same level of the market) or vertical 
(between undertakings at different levels of the market).
79
 In addition, the notion of an 
agreement covers not only legally binding contracts but also non-binding instruments such 
as gentlemen’s agreements.80 
Likewise, there is no relevant distinction to be made between the prevention, restriction, 
and distortion of competition.
81
 However, it is very important whether competition is 
restricted by object or effect, as object and effect are alternative – not cumulative – 
requirements.
82
 If an agreement has an anti-competitive object, it does not matter whether 
it really has anti-competitive effects. On the other hand, if the agreement does not have an 
anti-competitive object, the person alleging the infringement must prove the existence of 
anti-competitive effects.
83
 
Even today, there is no unequivocal way to define a restriction of competition, but some 
general observations can be made. First of all, a contractual restriction does not 
                                                 
78
 Case C-49/92 Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA EU:C:1999:356, para. 108. 
79
 Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 Établissements Consten SARL and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
EU:C:1966:41, p. 339. 
80
 See for example Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV  v Commission EU:C:1970:71. 
81
 Lorenz 2013, pp. 90–91. 
82
 Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm EU:C:1966:38 (STM), p. 249. 
83
 Jones and Sufrin 2014, p. 204. 
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automatically result in a restriction of competition.
84
 On the other hand, it is also not 
absolutely necessary to demonstrate consumer harm. A restriction of competition may also 
be found if the competitive process is undermined.
85
  
Restrictions by object refer to agreements that are injurious to competition by their very 
nature.
86
 In determining whether an agreement has an anti-competitive object, it is 
necessary to consider its objectives and the economic and legal context in which it 
operates. The parties’ intentions are relevant but not determinative.87 Certain types of 
restrictions are usually – but not always – regarded as restrictions by object. These so-
called hardcore restrictions include, among others, price fixing, output limitation, and 
market sharing.
88
 
On the other hand, a restriction by effect may be found only after conducting an extensive 
analysis of the relevant market.
89
 Again, regard must be had for the agreement’s economic 
and legal context.
90
 It is especially important to establish the counter-factual. In other 
words, it is necessary to examine whether the agreement really restricts competition that 
would otherwise occur.
91
 Furthermore, analysis is not limited to effects on current 
competition, as effects on potential competition must also be taken into account.
92
 
The de minimis rule applies here as well, which means that the effect on competition must 
be appreciable.
93
 However, there is no need to demonstrate appreciability if the agreement 
has an anti-competitive object. In Expedia, the ECJ ruled that restrictions by object are 
appreciable by their nature.
94
 
                                                 
84
 Whish and Bailey 2012, pp. 128–129. 
85
 Joined Cases C-501/06 etc. GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited and others v Commission 
EU:C:2009:610 (GlaxoSmithKline), para. 63. For an analysis of the case law on consumer welfare, see 
Daskalova 2015, pp. 149–154. 
86
 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Ltd EU:C:2008:643 (Beef Industry), para. 17. 
87
 GlaxoSmithKline, para. 58. 
88
 See Commission Staff Working Document – Guidance on Restrictions of Competition "by Object" for the 
Purpose of Defining Which Agreements May Benefit from the De Minimis Notice, C(2014) 4136 final, 25 
June 2014 (Guidance on Restrictions by Object). 
89
 Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu AG EU:C:1991:91, paras. 16–27. 
90
 Case 23/67 SA Brasserie de Haecht v Consorts Wilkin-Janssen EU:C:1967:54, p. 415. 
91
 STM, pp. 249–250. 
92
 Joined Cases T-374/94 etc. European Night Services Ltd and others v Commission EU:T:1998:198, para. 
137. 
93
 Völk, para. 5/7. 
94
 Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la Concurrence and others EU:C:2012:795, paras. 35–37. 
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3.4.2 Justifications 
There are three different justification methods under Article 101 TFEU. Prima facie 
restrictive agreements do not constitute restrictions, that is to say, infringe Article 101(1) 
TFEU if they come under the ancillary restraints exception or the Wouters inherency 
exception. Additionally, agreements that infringe Article 101(1) TFEU may be exempted 
under the Article 101(3) TFEU efficiency defense. 
The ancillary restraints exception can be invoked when an individual agreement is part of a 
broader main operation. If the main operation does not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, then 
neither does any directly related restrictive agreement that is objectively necessary and 
proportionate to the implementation of the main operation.
95
 
The Wouters inherency exception applies when an agreement pursues public policy 
objectives. The agreement does not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU if its restrictive effects 
are inherent and proportionate to its purported objectives.
96
 Thus far, this exception has 
only been applied in the context of regulatory rules. In particular, Wouters involved bar 
association rules that banned multi-disciplinary partnerships on the grounds that such 
partnerships could endanger the integrity of the legal profession.
97
 It has been sometimes 
suggested that this roundabout way of justifying restrictions is nowadays redundant since 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU no longer requires prior notification to the 
Commission.
 98
 However, the ECJ has continued to apply the Wouters inherency exception 
even after there has been no procedural need to do so.
99
 
Exemption under the Article 101(3) TFEU efficiency defense requires that two positive 
and two negative cumulative criteria are met. The agreement must contribute to 
“improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress” and allow “consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit”. Additionally, the 
agreement must not impose “restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of 
                                                 
95
 Communication from the Commission – Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 
[2004] OJ C 101/97 (Article 81(3) Guidelines), paras. 28–31. See Case T-112/99 Métropole Télévision (M6) 
and others v Commission EU:T:2001:215. 
96
 Case C-309/99 Wouters and others v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, intervener: 
Raad van de Balies van de Europese Gemeenschap, para. 97; Meca-Medina, para. 42. 
97
 Whish and Bailey 2012, pp. 132–133. 
98
 See for example Townley 2009, p. 246. 
99
 Case C-1/12 Ordem dos Técnicos Oficiais de Contas v Autoridade da Concorrência EU:C:2013:127, paras. 
93–100. 
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these objectives” or enable “eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question”. The efficiency defense is sometimes seen as a purely economic 
justification. However, case law reveals that public policy considerations are also relevant 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.
100
  
3.5 Article 102 TFEU 
3.5.1 Abuse of dominant position 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits “[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it . . . in so far as it may affect 
trade between Member States.” The important thing to keep in mind about Article 102 
TFEU is that it applies to unilateral conduct and not to mere collusion. All the same, 
collusion within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU can also constitute unilateral conduct 
within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU.
101
 
The first step is to establish dominance. As the wording of Article 102 TFEU suggests, 
undertakings can be in a dominant position either alone or collectively with other 
independent undertakings. Dominance refers to “a position of economic strength enjoyed 
by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on 
the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”102 A high 
market share is a strong indication of dominance, but other factors also need to be taken 
into account.
103
 Furthermore, the dominant position must be held within a substantial part 
of the internal market. In general, the territory of a single Member State may be regarded 
as a substantial part.
104
  
The next step is to determine whether there is abuse, for the mere possession of a dominant 
position is not prohibited. Abuse can be roughly described as behavior that could not have 
occurred in a market with normal competition.
105
  Article 102 TFEU imposes on a 
                                                 
100
 Townley 2009, pp. 142–168. 
101
 Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and others v 
Commission EU:C:2000:132 (Compagnie Maritime Belge), paras. 33–34. 
102
 Case 27/76 United Brands and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission EU:C:1978:22, para. 65. 
103
 Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] 
OJ C45/7 (Article 82 Guidance), paras. 12–18. 
104
 Case COMP/39.386  Long-term contracts France, 17 March 2010, para. 28. 
105
 Whish and Bailey 2012, p. 192. 
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dominant undertaking “a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market.”106 Exploitative abuse refers to behavior 
whereby a dominant undertaking takes advantage of its customers, whereas exclusionary 
abuse refers to behavior whereby a dominant undertaking prevents or hinders 
competition.
107
 Importantly, the de minimis rule does not apply here, so there is no need to 
demonstrate appreciability.
108
 
3.5.2 Justifications  
The framework of justifications under Article 102 TFEU has yet to fully develop. Article 
102 TFEU does not provide for any express exemptions, but the ECJ and the Commission 
have accepted that prima facie abuse may be “objectively justified” based on legitimate 
business interests, public policy objectives, and efficiency.
109
 
First of all, legitimate business behavior does not constitute abuse just because an 
undertaking is dominant. Even dominant undertakings are allowed to compete on the 
merits, protect their commercial interests, and respond to force majeure-like 
circumstances.
110
 
In addition, seemingly abusive conduct does not infringe Article 102 TFEU if it is 
necessary and proportionate to the attainment of public policy objectives.
111
 It would 
appear that the Wouters inherency exception in particular applies in cases involving private 
regulation.
112
 Nevertheless, it must be noted that public policy claims have seen very little 
success in practice.
113
  
It is also generally accepted that an efficiency defense exists under Article 102 TFEU. 
According to the Commission, the criteria for exemption are approximately the same as 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.
114
 All the same, it must be noted that efficiency considerations 
have not played a prominent role in the ECJ’s or the Commission’s decision practice.115 
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4 Convergent approach to sport 
4.1 Introduction  
Many sporting rules – including Articles 17 and 20 RSTP – fall within the scopes of both 
free movement and competition law. If free movement and competition law were to lead to 
different outcomes, then the same sporting rule could be first decreed lawful and then 
unlawful. This would go against the principles of legal certainty and clarity.
116
 
Consequently, as Advocate General (AG) Kokott aptly put it, “conflicting assessments of 
the fundamental freedoms and competition law are to be avoided in principle.”117  
Neither the Commission nor the ECJ has expressly adopted a convergent approach to 
sport.
118
 In Meca-Medina, the ECJ actually even stated that the fact that there is no breach 
of free movement law does not mean that there is no breach of competition law because the 
specific requirements of each relevant provision must be accounted for.
119
 However, there 
is no need to construe the ECJ’s remarks as a rejection of convergence. It seems more 
likely that the ECJ was just criticizing the GC for applying the law in a vague manner.
120  
While convergence is desirable, it cannot be complete. Free movement and competition 
law are both instruments of the internal market, but they do have slightly different aims. 
Free movement law is concerned with non-discrimination and freedom of cross-border 
trade, whereas competition law is concerned with consumer welfare and the proper 
functioning of the competitive process.
121
 Therefore, as the ECJ stated in Meca-Medina, it 
is necessary to consider the specific requirements of each relevant provision. Nonetheless, 
free movement and competition law can still be applied harmoniously in so far as the 
established framework allows it.  
Importantly, there is no convergence at the restriction stage.
122
 The same sporting rule may 
very well restrict free movement but not competition and vice versa. For example, purely 
internal situations fall outside the scope of free movement law, but they can still affect 
                                                 
116
 Pijetlovic 2015, p. 216. 
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trade between Member States and thereby fall within the scope of competition law.
123
 On 
the other hand, there is a great degree of convergence at the justification stage.
124
 The legal 
tests are very similar even if not completely identical. 
As a more of a side note, it can be mentioned that the Commission has extensive powers to 
enforce competition law but limited powers to enforce free movement law. Article 105 
TFEU allows the Commission to adopt legally binding decisions concerning infringements 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. On the other hand, when it comes to free movement 
provisions, the Commission may only bring cases against Member States in accordance 
with Article 258 TFEU. In principle, the Commission could pursue indirect action against 
private sporting bodies by claiming that a Member State has failed its duty to protect the 
free movement rights of sportspeople.
125
 However, it seems quite unlikely that the 
Commission would ever resort to this course of action. 
4.2 The restriction stage 
Based on the ECJ’s and the Commission’s case law, it is apparent that there is really 
nothing special about applying free movement and competition law to sport at the 
restriction stage. Sporting rules constitute restrictions under the same conditions as other 
rules and regulations.
126
 Therefore, because there is also no convergence at this stage, a 
general presentation of the issue is not needed nor particularly informative.  
However, it is worth noting that certain rules fall outside the scope of EU law even though 
they relate to economic sporting activity. This is because only rules that produce economic 
effects can constitute restrictions. Consequently, the so-called rules of the game are not 
generally subject to EU law even in so far as they are applied in the context of professional 
sports. For example, it is difficult to imagine how the offside rule in football could be 
construed as restricting free movement or competition.
127
  
Finally, it must be pointed out that there is only a prima facie restriction at this stage. 
Prima facie restrictions may still fail to constitute “actual” restrictions if they are justified 
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by legitimate objectives. This distinction between prima facie and “actual” restrictions will 
be explained in the following two sections. 
4.3 The justification stage 
4.3.1 Methods under free movement law 
Under free movement law, there are three distinct methods of justifying sporting rules: the 
purely sporting exception, the Deliège inherency exception, and the imperative 
requirements doctrine. If a rule is either purely sporting or inherent, then the prima facie 
restrictive sporting rule does not constitute an “actual” restriction. On the other hand, if the 
imperative requirements doctrine applies, then there is an “actual” restriction that is 
nonetheless justified. 
First, sporting rules do not constitute restrictions if they are based on purely sporting 
motives, remain limited to their proper objectives, and relate to the particular nature and 
context of certain sporting events.
128
 This exception originated in Walrave and was later 
slightly modified in Doná.
129
 So far, only rules concerning the composition of national 
teams have been regarded as purely sporting rules. However, the ECJ has not ruled out the 
possibility of other types of purely sporting rules.
130
 
Second, sporting rules do not constitute restrictions if they derive from a need inherent in 
the organization of sport.
131
 This exception originated in Deliège. The case involved a 
judoka who challenged the selection rules for international tournaments. The ECJ 
conceded that rules limiting the number of participants from each national association 
“would appear” to restrict the freedom to provide services.132 Nonetheless, the contested 
rules did not ultimately constitute a restriction because “such a limitation is inherent in the 
conduct of an international high-level sports event, which necessarily involves certain 
selection rules or criteria being adopted.”133  
It is unclear why the ECJ decided to introduce these two justification methods that are not 
compatible with the general framework of free movement law. The purely sporting 
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exception can perhaps be explained by the fact that Walrave involved direct 
discrimination. Since none of the express derogations were applicable, the ECJ had to 
come up with another way to justify nationality restrictions in international 
championships.
134
 On the other hand, Deliège did not involve direct discrimination, so the 
ECJ could have relied on the imperative requirements doctrine. One possible explanation is 
that the ECJ wished to signal that certain sporting rules are to be scrutinized less strictly 
than others.
135
 
Finally, sporting rules that are neither purely sporting nor inherent constitute restrictions 
and must be justified by imperative requirements.
136
 In principle, express derogations may 
also be invoked, but it is difficult to imagine any situation in which they might apply. This 
justification method was first applied to sport in Bosman.
137
 Justification under the 
imperative requirements doctrine requires that the sporting rule pursues legitimate 
objectives to which it is proportionate. Interestingly, case law suggests that even directly 
discriminatory sporting rules may be justified by imperative requirements.
138
 
Even though the three justification methods appear quite different at first glance, they are 
actually quite similar. The ECJ’s remarks about “questions of purely sporting interest” and 
“being limited to proper objectives” in Walrave may be understood as references to 
legitimate objectives and proportionality.
 139
 On the other hand, no similar references can 
be found in Deliège. Nonetheless, it would go against the fundamental principles of free 
movement law if restrictions could be justified solely based on some vague notion of 
inherency. Moreover, under competition law, inherent restrictions are justified only if they 
pursue legitimate objectives and are proportionate.
140
  
All in all, sporting rules can be justified under free movement law as long as they pursue 
legitimate objectives and are proportionate.  Moreover, if the rules are either purely 
sporting or inherent, then they do not constitute restrictions in the first place. 
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4.3.2 Methods under competition law 
Competition law provides for various justification methods, but only the Wouters 
inherency exception and the efficiency defense have been applied in the sporting context. 
Based on Piau, it would appear that the criteria for justification are the same under both 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
141
 However, there is one formal distinction to be made here. If 
the Wouters inherency exception or the Article 102 TFEU efficiency defense applies, then 
the prima facie restrictive sporting rule does not constitute an “actual” restriction. On the 
other hand, if the Article 101(3) TFEU efficiency defense applies, then there is an “actual” 
restriction that is nevertheless justified. 
The ECJ first applied the Wouters inherency exception to sport in Meca-Medina,
142
 though 
the Commission had already done so in ENIC.
143
 According to this justification method, 
sporting rules do not constitute restrictions if their restrictive effects are inherent and 
proportionate to their legitimate objectives.
144
  
Some commentators argue that restrictions by object cannot benefit from the Wouters 
inherency exception.
145
 However, recent case law suggests otherwise, as the ECJ has 
stressed on multiple occasions that an anti-competitive object may be found only after 
taking into account the agreement’s objectives.146 Furthermore, the Commission has 
expressly recognized that prima facie restrictions by object may in exceptional cases fall 
outside the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU on the grounds that they are “objectively 
necessary” for the attainment of legitimate goals.147  
The efficiency defense is still often seen as a purely economic justification, and its 
relevance in the sporting context is therefore doubted. However, the Commission has been 
very much willing to accept that sporting objectives may be subsumed under the notion of 
“improving the production or distribution of goods.” The most important cases in this 
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context are SETCA,
148
 UEFA Champions League,
149
 and Piau.
150
 Consequently, non-
inherent sporting rules can still often be justified under the efficiency defense.
151
  
In fact, the efficiency defense is quite an appropriate justification method. Sporting 
objectives are usually not purely public policy objectives in the same sense as public 
security or public health. For example, competitive balance is pursued because it makes 
sport more interesting for spectators (and thereby more profitable for clubs and 
associations). In other words, competitive balance produces higher quality products in the 
form of more exciting matches.
152
 
Justification under the efficiency defense requires that four criteria are met. The measure 
must produce efficiencies, and a fair share of those efficiencies must be passed on to 
consumers. In addition, the measure must be indispensable, and competition must not be 
eliminated. These criteria actually encompass the proportionality test.
153
 In particular, the 
first criterion requires that there is a causal link between the measure and the claimed 
efficiencies.
154
 The third criterion requires that the measure is “reasonably necessary.”155 
Finally, the second criterion requires not only that the efficiencies are passed on to 
consumers but also that they are balanced against the restriction of competition.
156
 In other 
words, the restriction must be suitable, necessary, and proportionate stricto sensu. 
In conclusion, justification under competition law is possible if the sporting rule pursues 
legitimate objectives and is proportionate. Furthermore, non-inherent sporting rules must 
satisfy two additional criteria: they must benefit consumers and not eliminate competition. 
In practice, these two additional criteria are not terribly important. If the sporting rule 
contributes to the good of the game, then consumers will benefit from more exciting 
matches as a result. On other hand, while sporting rules may often restrict competition, 
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they rarely eliminate it.
157
 Furthermore, if competition is eliminated, then the restriction 
cannot usually be considered proportionate in the first place.
 158
 
4.3.3 Inherency 
There appears to be an important distinction between inherent and non-inherent rules under 
both free movement and competition law. However, it is not immediately apparent what 
inherency really means in practice. 
UEFA Champions League is a relatively rare example of a case in which the inherency test 
was expressly failed. UEFA argued that the joint selling of broadcasting rights is necessary 
in order to ensure financial solidarity between clubs, but the Commission disagreed and 
found an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. The Commission pointed out that football 
leagues could exist without any joint selling arrangements, as there are other less restrictive 
means of redistributing revenue between clubs.
159
 Nevertheless, the Commission hinted 
that justification on the grounds of financial solidarity might have still been possible under 
Article 101(3) TFEU. However, since the joint selling arrangement could be exempted 
based on other types of efficiencies, there was no need to discuss the issue any further.
160
 
Based on UEFA Champions League and other case law, it appears that inherent rules are 
those without which sport could not exist.
161
 In other words, sporting rules are not inherent 
if there are other viable alternatives.
162
  Nevertheless, non-inherent rules may still be 
justified under the imperative requirements doctrine and the efficiency defense if their 
positive effects outweigh their restrictive effects.
163
 
To illustrate, sport would not really be sport if doping was allowed, and organizing 
international tournaments would be virtually impossible if anyone could participate. On the 
other hand, professional football can exist just fine without out-of-contract transfer fees 
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and joint selling arrangements. Therefore, the rules in Meca-Medina and Deliège were 
inherent, while the rules in Bosman and UEFA Champions League were non-inherent. 
So far, only non-discriminatory rules have been considered inherent. It is therefore often 
argued that discriminatory rules cannot be considered inherent.
164
 For the most part, it is 
true that sport can exist without any discriminatory rules. However, nationality restrictions 
in international championships can surely be regarded as inherent, as the very idea of 
friendly competition between nations would be lost otherwise. Accordingly, the possibility 
of inherent discriminatory rules should not be completely excluded even though such rules 
are obviously few and far between.
165
  
4.3.4 Convergence of justification methods 
First of all, it is submitted that there is total convergence between free movement and 
competition law when it comes to purely sporting and inherent rules. It is difficult to find 
anything in the ECJ’s or the Commissions case law that would suggest that the notion of 
inherency is not the same under both free movement and competition law. On the contrary, 
the ECJ used extremely similar language in both Meca-Medina and Deliège.
166
 As argued 
in the previous section, the notion of inherency is not related to discrimination but to 
whether or not sport could exist without the contested rule.
167
 It would be very odd if the 
same rule was first decreed inherent and then non-inherent in the same judgment. 
Moreover, as likewise argued in the previous section, purely sporting rules are also 
inherent rules, for sport could not exist without them. 
On the other hand, convergence is not total when it comes to non-inherent rules. Rules that 
are justified under the imperative requirements doctrine are not automatically justified 
under the efficiency defense. First, justification on the grounds of efficiency is possible 
only if the rule can be considered to improve the production of sport. Second, the rule must 
benefit consumers and not eliminate competition. Be that as it may, as discussed in section 
4.3.2, these additional criteria rarely make a difference in practice. Alternatively, rules that 
are justified under the efficiency defense are justified under the imperative requirements 
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doctrine as long as the claimed efficiencies can be construed as public policy objectives. 
There is no need to conduct another proportionality test since only proportionate 
restrictions are justified under the efficiency defense. 
In conclusion, convergence cannot be complete because the imperative requirements 
doctrine and the efficiency defense are not identical justification methods. It is nonetheless 
worth noting that whatever differences exist are not arbitrary and can actually be traced 
back to the fact that free movement and competition law have slightly different goals. 
Because competition law is concerned with consumer welfare and the proper functioning 
of the competitive process, it makes perfect sense that even proportionate restrictions 
cannot be justified if they do not benefit consumers or if they eliminate competition. 
4.3.5 Proportionality in the sporting context 
As is apparent based on the previous sections of this chapter, it is proportionality that lies 
at the heart of EU sports law. Because both free movement and competition law have very 
broad scopes, controversial sporting rules often constitute at least prima facie restrictions. 
Nonetheless, more often than not, those same rules also pursue legitimate objectives and 
produce efficiencies. Therefore, the most important question is whether the rules are 
proportionate. 
The standard of applying the proportionality test was set in Bernard. Bernard is a free 
movement case, but it is safe to assume that the same standard applies under competition 
law as well.
168
 The ECJ stated as follows: 
In considering whether a system which restricts the freedom of movement of such 
players is suitable to ensure that the said objective is attained and does not go beyond 
what is necessary to attain it, account must be taken . . . of the specific characteristics 
of sport in general, and football in particular, and of their social and educational 
function.
169
  
To put it in a nutshell, the socio-educational function of sport must be taken into account 
when applying the proportionality test. This seemingly implies that the proportionality test 
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is to be applied less strictly than usual. However, it remains to be seen whether this is 
really true and to what extent.
170
  
All the same, this does not actually mean that there is a uniform way of applying the 
proportionality test to sport. Sport is not a homogenous activity, and there are various 
different types of sporting rules that pursue various objectives. Therefore, the 
proportionality tests must be conducted on a case-by-cases basis.
171
 In particular, it is 
necessary to take into account the type and seriousness of the restriction. For example, a 
ban must be scrutinized more intensely than a fine, and a fine of 10,000 euros must be 
scrutinized more intensely than a fine of 1,000 euros.
172
 
It would also appear that the proportionality test is applied less strictly if the rule is 
inherent.
173
 In comparison to Bosman, the ECJ applied the proportionality test in a 
relatively lax manner in Meca-Medina.
174
 Admittedly, inherent rules must be strictly 
necessary in the sense that sport could not exist without them, but, Meca-Medina, the ECJ 
did not really discuss whether the individual details of the contested rules were 
proportionate.  
It is also important to note that, at least in principle, the same rule could be proportionate 
under free movement law but disproportionate under competition law and vice versa. After 
all, the same rule does not necessarily have an equally serious effect on both free 
movement and competition. Moreover, applying the proportionality test involves balancing 
the restriction against, on one hand, the objectives of free movement law and, on the other 
hand, the objectives of competition law. 
For example, let us imagine that FIFA’s rules prohibit a certain small subsection of players 
from transferring internationally. There would be a serious restriction on the free 
movement of workers, for the affected individuals would be completely robbed of their 
right to free movement. In comparison, competition between clubs would not be restricted 
as severely since clubs could still freely sign on all other players. This example is 
obviously exaggerated, but the point still stands. 
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Nevertheless, the practical importance of this issue should not be overestimated. The 
proportionality test is not an exact mathematical equation, and it is probably only rarely 
possible to establish any quantitative difference between the restriction of free movement 
and the restriction of competition.
175
 Accordingly, there is generally no need to conduct 
two separate proportionality tests, but one must be on the lookout for differences and be 
prepared to take them into account. 
5 The FIFA transfer system 
5.1 The Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players 
5.1.1 Article 17 RSTP: contractual stability 
The FIFA RSTP contains multiple provisions on player contracts, but this thesis focuses on 
only one of them, namely Article 17 RSTP. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to examine the 
context in which Article 17 RSTP operates. 
First of all, it is important keep in mind that players are virtually always employed for a 
fixed term. Contract lengths are regulated in Article 18(2) RSTP. The minimum length of a 
contract is from its effective date until the end of the season, whereas the maximum length 
of a contract is five years. Furthermore, players under the age of 18 may not sign contracts 
for a term longer than three years. 
The principle of contractual stability is laid out in Article 13 RSTP. In general, contracts 
may be terminated only by mutual agreement or upon expiry, but there are naturally some 
exceptions. According to Article 14 RSTP, either party may unilaterally terminate the 
contract without any consequences if they have just cause. Non-payment of salary is 
perhaps the most common example of just cause.
176
 In addition, according to Article 15 
RSTP, an established professional may terminate his contract on the grounds of sporting 
just cause if he has played in fewer than 10% of official matches. No sporting sanctions 
shall be imposed, but the player may still have to pay compensation.
177
  
Article 17(1) RSTP stipulates that compensation is payable in all cases of unilateral 
termination of contract without just cause. Compensation is calculated with due 
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consideration for the law of the country concerned, the specificity of sport, and any other 
objective criteria. These objective criteria include, in particular, the remuneration and other 
benefits due to the player, the time remaining on the contract, fees and expenses paid by 
the former club (amortized over the term of the contract), and whether the breach falls 
within the protected period.
178
 The protected period lasts three seasons if the contract was 
signed before the player’s 28th birthday and two seasons if the contract was signed after the 
player’s 28th birthday.179 Article 17(2) RSTP provides that the player and his new club 
shall be jointly and severally liable for the compensation and that compensation may be 
agreed upon by the parties. 
Furthermore, Article 17(3) provides for sporting sanctions if a player is found to be in 
breach of contract during the protected period. The player shall be prohibited from playing 
in official matches for four month. In case of aggravating circumstances, the ban may be 
extended to six months. This provision also specifies that the protected period starts again 
when a contract is extended. 
Likewise, Article 17(4) provides for sporting sanctions if a club is found to be in breach of 
contract or inducing a breach of contract during the protected period. Unless proven 
otherwise, the club is assumed to have induced the breach when it signs on a player who 
breached during the protected period. The club shall be prohibited from registering any 
new players for two registration periods. Additionally, Article 17(5) RSTP stipulates that 
any other person subject to FIFA’s rules shall also be sanctioned if they act in a manner 
designed to induce a breach of contract. 
Moreover, Article 16 RSTP prohibits unilateral termination of contract during the season 
unless there is just case within the meaning of Article 14 RSTP.
180
 Otherwise, according to 
Articles 15 and 17(3) RSTP, the player must give notice of termination within 15 days of 
the last official match of the season. Failure to do say may lead to disciplinary sanctions. 
Article 22 RSTP allows clubs and players to seek redress before national courts in 
employment related disputes. Nevertheless, the FIFA DRC is still the de facto forum for 
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international player contract disputes.
181
 According to Article 24 RSTP, the FIFA DRC’s 
decisions may be appealed to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). 
5.1.2 The positive interest principle 
The various criteria listed in Article 17 RSTP do not tell the whole truth about how 
compensation is calculated in practice. It is also paramount to know what the CAS makes 
of Article 17 RSTP. In the following three cases, the player had unilaterally terminated his 
contract outside the protected period. 
At first, the CAS adopted a very player-friendly way of calculating compensation in 
Webster. The CAS based its calculations on the residual value of the contract, that is to 
say, the remaining remuneration due to the player. The club claimed a loss of 4 million 
pounds based on the player’s estimated transfer value, but the CAS only awarded 150,000 
pounds.
182
 In particular, the CAS noted that taking into account the loss of a transfer fee 
would punish the player and unjustly enrich the club.
183
 Moreover, the transfer system 
would be brought back to the pre-Bosman days.
184
 
Webster suggested that players may to buy out their contracts once the protected period has 
expired. Unsurprisingly, this did not meet a positive response from FIFA or the clubs. 
Subsequently, the CAS took a very different approach in Matuzalem and argued as 
follows: 
The purpose of art. 17 is basically nothing else than to reinforce contractual stability, 
i.e. to strengthen the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the world of international 
football, by acting as deterrent against unilateral contractual breaches and 
terminations, be it breaches committed by a club or by a player.
185
 
In Matuzalem, the CAS adopted the so-called positive interest principle, according to 
which the injured party is to be put in the same position as if the contract had been properly 
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performed.
186
 Accordingly, this time, the CAS did take into account the loss of a transfer 
fee.
187
 Compensation was set at 11,858,934 euros.
188
 In comparison, the residual value of 
the contract was only 2,400,000 euros.
189
 
In De Sanctis, the CAS reiterated that compensation is to be calculated in accordance with 
the positive interest principle.
190
 However, in this particular case, the parties failed to 
produce sufficient evidence concerning the player’s transfer value.191  Consequently, the 
CAS based its calculations on the former club’s replacement costs, that is to say, the cost 
of recruiting an equivalent player (or in this case two players).
192
 Compensation was set at 
2,250,055 euros. Interestingly, the residual value of the contract was actually somewhat 
higher at 2,950,734 euros.
193
  
In conclusion, the CAS continues to assert the positive interest principle, but it does not 
always calculate compensation in the same way. In fact, it would appear that the CAS is 
being intentionally unpredictable. In Matuzalem, the CAS actually stated that “any party 
should be well advised to respect an existing contract as the financial consequences of a 
breach or a termination without just cause would be, in their size and amount, rather 
unpredictable.”194 
In Matuzalem, the CAS made it clear that the positive interest principle applies also when a 
club is in breach of contract.
195
 However, in practice, clubs generally only have to pay 
compensation based on the residual value of the contract since players do not generally 
suffer any losses that are comparable to the loss of a transfer fee.
196
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5.1.3 Article 20 RSTP: training compensation 
The provisions on training compensation are located in Article 20 and Annex 4 RSTP. The 
basic principle is that the new club must pay training compensation when a player signs his 
first professional contract and on each subsequent transfer between clubs of two different 
national associations. Importantly, the obligation to pay training compensation arises even 
if the player’s contract has already expired. Compensation is payable until the end of the 
season of the player’s 23rd birthday. 
No compensation is due if the player’s contract was terminated without just cause, the 
player transfers to a category IV club (IV being the lowest and I being the highest), or the 
player reacquires amateur status.
197
 Furthermore, if the player transfers within the EU/EEA 
and the former club does not offer the player a new contract, no compensation is payable 
unless the former club can justify why it should still be entitled to compensation.
198
 
Compensation is payable for costs incurred between the seasons of the player’s 12th and 
21
st
 birthdays unless it is evident that the player finished his training period before his 21
st
 
birthday.
199
 When the player signs his first professional contract, compensation is divided 
between all the clubs that contributed to the player’s training. In the case of subsequent 
transfers, training compensation is paid only to the player’s former club.200  
In order to calculate training compensation, national associations have been instructed to 
divide their clubs into a maximum of four categories. The training costs for these four 
categories are set by UEFA and the other continental associations. The pre-determined 
sums are supposed to correspond to the amount needed to train one professional player for 
one year multiplied with the so-called player factor. The player factor is the ratio of players 
that need to be trained in order to produce one professional player.
201
 The yearly training 
costs for UEFA clubs range between 10,000 and 90,000 euros.
202
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As a general rule, training compensation is calculated based on the training costs of the 
new club.
203
 However, compensation for the first four seasons between the player’s 12th 
and 15
th
 birthdays is calculated based on the costs of category IV clubs.
204
 Moreover, 
special provisions apply for transfers within the EU/EEA. If the player transfers from a 
lower to a higher category club, compensation is calculated based on the average costs of 
the two clubs. On the other hand, if the player transfers from a higher to a lower category 
club, compensation is based on the costs of the lower category club.
205
 
In principle, the maximum training compensation for a transfer within the EU/EEA is 
580,000 euros. However, the FIFA DRC may adjust training compensation if it is clearly 
disproportionate. Importantly, compensation may be not only lowered but also raised.
206
 
The rules for calculating training compensation are quite complicated, so an example is in 
order. The player signs his first professional contract with a German category I club. The 
player has previously trained in a Finnish category III club for seven seasons starting from 
the season of his 12
th
 birthday. Compensation for the first four seasons is based on the 
costs of category IV clubs and amounts to 40,000 euros (4x10,000). Because the player 
transfers to a higher category club within the EU/EEA, compensation for the three 
remaining seasons is based on the average  costs of the two clubs and amounts to 180,000 
euros (3x(90,000+30,000)/2). In total, the new club must pay 220,000 euros in training 
compensation. When the player later transfers to a French category I club after two 
seasons, the new club must pay 180,000 euros (2x90,000) in training compensation. 
5.1.4 Disciplinary sanctions 
The FIFA Disciplinary Code (DC) provides for various sanctions for anyone who fails to 
comply with FIFA’s regulations. In particular, Article 64 DC is applicable when a club or a 
player fails to pay compensation under Article 17 or 20 RSTP despite being ordered to do 
so in a FIFA DRC decision or a subsequent CAS award. Clubs may be fined, banned from 
registering new players, relegated to a lower league, and have points deducted. Players 
may be fined and banned from all football-related activity. 
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The aftermath of the Matuzalem case provides a telling example of what players can expect 
to face if they fail to comply with FIFA’s rules. Neither Mr. Matuzalem nor his new club 
could afford to pay the compensation sum of almost 12 million euros. Therefore, the FIFA 
Disciplinary Committee banned Mr. Matuzalem from all football-related activity and 
deducted points from his new club. The CAS did not overturn these sanctions on appeal.
207
 
However, Mr. Matuzalem appealed to the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland. CAS 
awards are subject to Swiss law because the CAS has its seat in Switzerland.
208
 The Court 
overturned Mr. Matuzalem’s ban on the grounds that it violated Swiss public policy. The 
threat of an unlimited occupational ban infringed on Mr. Matuzalem’s privacy rights. 
Furthermore, the ban was actually counterproductive to its purpose of ensuring the timely 
payment of debts, as it deprived Mr. Matuzalem of income that he could have used to settle 
his debts. The ban was also unnecessary because CAS awards can be enforced under the 
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
(New York Convention).
209
 
5.2 The economic effects of the transfer system  
Both free movement and competition law require proof when asserting a justification. It is 
not enough to merely claim that a restriction pursues legitimate objectives or produces 
efficiencies.
210
 Moreover, the Commission has specifically called for evidence-based 
policy-making in the sports sector
 211
 Therefore, in order to assess the legality of Articles 
17 and 20 RSTP, it is important to know what effect they have on football.  
The Commission had concerns about the transfer system even before FIFPro’s complaint 
and therefore ordered a study titled The Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of 
Players. The findings of this study are obviously not absolute truths, but they are quite 
convincing in the absence of contradicting evidence. It is also worth noting that this study 
is hardly ground-breaking, as it mostly just confirms what many already suspected. 
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The study concludes that there is no competitive balance in European football. A small 
group of elite clubs dominate national leagues throughout Europe.  Furthermore, the UEFA 
Champions League is nowadays a de facto closed league in which the same clubs compete 
for the title year after year. The traditional system of promotion and relegation does not 
function in practice, for clubs from outside the big five leagues (England, Italy, Germany, 
France, and Spain) have very little chance of qualifying.
212
 
Importantly, the study reports a link between transfer expenditure and sporting success. 
The more money a club spends on transfers, the more likely it is to win games. Therefore, 
it appears that the transfer system does not improve but actually undermines competitive 
balance. It is true that there is also a link between salary expenditure and sporting success. 
However, even if transfer fees are not the fundamental cause of competitive imbalance, 
they still exacerbate the issue.
213
 
On a more positive note, transfer fees clearly have a redistributive effect. Money flows 
from big countries, leagues, and clubs to small countries, leagues, and clubs. Accordingly, 
transfer fees ensure the financial survival of many small clubs. On the other hand, the 
training compensation scheme does not have a notable redistributive effect. The study 
found that solidarity and training compensation payments accounted for only 1.84% of all 
transfer spending in Europe.
214
 
Nonetheless, the study does not advocate abolishing the transfer system because doing so 
would harm small clubs while mainly benefitting elite players.
215
 Its recommendations 
include limiting excessive transfer fees and improving the enforcement of the training 
compensation scheme and the solidarity mechanism.
216
  
In contrast, microeconomic theory suggests that the transfer system does actually slightly 
improve competitive balance. Késenne argues that competitive balance is improved simply 
because money flows from big to small clubs. In such a situation, small clubs can spend 
more money on players, whereas big clubs have less money to spend on players. 
Unfortunately, redistribution of revenue can only ever have a minor effect on competitive 
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balance, as the distribution of talent in team sports is unequal by definition. The best 
players will always gravitate towards the richest clubs, for only they can afford to pay the 
highest salaries.
217
 
In addition, Terviö argues that the transfer system encourages clubs to invest in the training 
of young players by ensuring that long-term contracts are enforceable. Because players 
cannot currently freely unilaterally terminate their contracts, clubs can expect to benefit 
from the investments they make into the training of young players. On the other hand, if 
players could freely leave at any time, clubs could only expect revenue from a player’s 
current output. As a result, clubs would favor experienced players over young novices. 
Furthermore, there would be more mediocre players instead of both good and bad players 
since known talent would be favored over potential talent.
218
  
6 Contractual stability and training compensation in the light of 
EU Law 
6.1 Preliminary comments 
6.1.1 EU Case law on transfer rules 
Before beginning an analysis of Articles 17 and 20 RSTP, it is worth taking a look back at 
what the ECJ and the Commission have said about transfer rules in the past in Bosman, 
SETCA, and Bernard. These cases will be briefly summarized in order to make this chapter 
easier to follow. 
In Bosman, the ECJ was called upon to evaluate the legality of out-of-contract transfer 
fees. Mr. Bosman was offered a new contract only at the league minimum wage, so he 
wished to transfer from Belgium to France. A transfer deal was agreed upon but fell 
through, and, as a result, Mr. Bosman was unable to play for any club. 
The contested rules were not discriminatory, for similar rules would have applied even if 
Mr. Bosman had transferred to another club in Belgium. All the same, the rules still 
constituted a restriction within the meaning of Article 45 TFEU because they impeded 
access to another Member State’s labor market.219 The ECJ accepted competitive balance 
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and encouraging the recruitment and training of young players as legitimate objectives but 
did not consider transfer fees a proportionate means of achieving those objectives. In 
particular, the ECJ noted that transfer fees were uncertain and contingent by nature, 
unrelated to actual training costs, and did not prevent the richest clubs from hiring the best 
players. Moreover, there were less restrictive alternatives to transfer fees.
220
 
The ECJ did not address competition law issues in Bosman, but AG Lenz wrote on the 
subject in in his opinion. AG Lenz argued that transfer fees infringed Article 101 TFEU on 
the grounds that they shared sources of supply.
221
 On the other hand, AG Lenz found no 
infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Clubs were perhaps collectively dominant, but no 
abuse could be established since the clubs had not acted unilaterally against their 
competitors, their customers, or the consumers.
222
 
In the aftermath of Bosman, FIFA introduced an absolute ban on unilateral termination of 
contract. The Commission objected, and FIFA eventually agreed to amend its rules. In 
SETCA, the Commission rejected a complaint that had been lodged by a Belgian labor 
union and gave its blessing to FIFA’s new rules on contractual stability. In effect, the 
Commission addressed Article 17 RSTP, though the RSTP had not yet been formally 
adopted at the time. 
The Commission admitted that the new rules probably still restricted free movement within 
the meaning of Article 45 TFEU. Nonetheless, the rules could be justified because they 
ensured team stability and thereby guaranteed the regularity of competitions and the 
integrity of championships. On the other hand, the Commission found no violation of 
Article 101(1) TFEU, as the rules did not have an appreciable effect on competition due to 
their limited scope. Moreover, the rules could be in any case exempted under Article 
101(3) TFEU since they improved the production of sport by ensuring team stability and 
thereby making football more exciting for spectators.
223
 
Bernard involved French football regulations that required young football players to sign 
their first professional contract with the club that had trained them. Mr. Bernard ignored 
these regulations and signed on with another club in England instead. Consequently, Mr. 
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Bernard’s former club sued him for breach of contract and claimed compensation equal to 
the remuneration it had offered Mr. Bernard. 
The ECJ promptly concluded that there was a restriction on the free movement of 
workers.
224
  The ECJ accepted that some type of training compensation scheme could in 
principle be justified by the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young 
players.
225
  However, the French regulations under review were not proportionate because 
they provided for compensation that was unrelated to actual training costs and not based on 
pre-determined criteria.
226
 
6.1.2 CAS awards and EU law 
In practice, challenging the legality of FIFA’s rules can often require challenging the 
validity of a CAS award. Therefore, it is important to examine the relationship between EU 
law and arbitration awards. All Member States are signatories to the New York 
Convention, under which foreign arbitration awards are enforceable unless one of the 
specific grounds for refusal is met. One of the grounds for refusal is public policy.
227
  
In Eco Swiss, the ECJ ruled that “the provisions of Article [101 TFEU] may be regarded as 
a matter of public policy within the meaning of the New York Convention.”228 Later, 
Article 102 TFEU was also declared to be a matter of public policy.
229
 It is also safe to 
assume that free movement provisions – including Article 45 TFEU – are equally a part of 
the EU’s public policy.230 Accordingly, the existence of a CAS award does not prevent 
players or clubs from seeking redress. National courts must refuse to enforce CAS awards 
that infringe Articles 45, 101 or 102 TFEU on the grounds that they are contrary to public 
policy.
231
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6.1.3 The loss of a transfer fee as damages 
It is also important to recognize that the fact that Article 17 RSTP provides for 
compensation for unilateral termination of contract is not inherently problematic. 
Requiring the player to compensate for actual losses suffered by the club is not in conflict 
with EU law. The problem is that Article 17 RSTP goes beyond this, as players cannot 
freely transfer even after fulfilling their obligations under national law.
232
   
In particular, as the CAS itself noted in Webster, the loss of a transfer fee cannot be 
considered a recoverable damage. For the most part, a player’s transfer value is not a result 
of demonstrable investments made by the club.
233
 Moreover, the whole argument is based 
on a somewhat paradoxical premise, as the player can always refuse a transfer and sit out 
his contract. In such a situation, the club does not receive a transfer fee even though the 
contract has been properly performed.
234
 
The argument that transfer fees may be taken into account as replacement costs is 
somewhat more convincing. However, this argument falls apart when one remembers that 
clubs would not have to pay high transfer fees in the first place if Article 17 RSTP did not 
exist. As the ECJ noted in Bosman, the maintenance of a restriction of free movement 
cannot be justified on the grounds that such a restriction existed in the past.
235
 The same 
logic surely applies under competition law as well. Consequently, Article 17 RSTP and the 
positive interest principle cannot be defended by merely referencing to losses suffered by 
clubs. 
Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that things would be different if clubs paid transfer 
fees completely of their own free will simply to avoid litigation. In such a scenario, it 
would seem reasonable to require a player to compensate for an amortized part of the 
replacing player’s transfer fee. 
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6.2 Restriction on the free movement of workers 
Based on Bosman and Bernard, it is fairly obvious that Articles 17 and 20 RSTP constitute 
restrictions on the free movement of workers. Nevertheless, a more detailed analysis is in 
order because the new transfer system is not identical to the old transfer system. 
First of all, professional players are clearly workers within the meaning of Article 45 
TFEU. They are engaged in genuine and effective economic activity by definition because 
Article 2 RSTP stipulates that players are professionals only if they are remunerated for 
more than their expenses. Moreover, players carry out their sporting activities for and 
under the direction of their club and not as self-employed service providers. Among other 
things, it can be cited that players do not generally choose their own working hours or 
share financial risk with their club.
236
  
It is also perfectly clear that players may invoke Article 45 TFEU even though FIFA is a 
private organization whose actions cannot be attributed to any Member State. The reason 
for this is that Article 45 TFEU has horizontal direct effect and therefore applies to all 
collective regulation.
237
 
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP cannot be regarded as directly discriminatory, for they do not 
mention nationality. Nevertheless, national transfer rules are often more favorable than 
FIFA’s transfer rules. For example, the maximum yearly training compensation for 
domestic transfers within Finland is only 300 euros.
238
 In comparison, the minimum yearly 
training compensation for international transfer within the EU is 10,000 euros. In principle, 
national transfer rules may also provide for lower compensation for unilateral termination 
of contract. However, whatever differential treatment exists in this context is not 
pronounced, as compensation for unilateral termination of contract is not based on any pre-
determined sums of money. 
Restrictions are indirectly discriminatory if they are intrinsically liable to affect non-
nationals more than nationals and there is risk that the former will be put at a particular 
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disadvantage.
239
 AG Lenz noted in Bosman that less favorable treatment of international 
transfers constitutes discrimination against players who wish to seek employment in other 
Member States.
240
 Be that as it may, it is not immediately apparent whether this type of 
differential treatment can be characterized as discrimination based on nationality. 
However, the situation can be construed in a slightly different manner. The differential 
treatment is actually based on the player’s country of employment. International transfers 
involve players who were previously employed in another Member State, whereas 
domestic transfers involve players who were previously employed in the host Member 
State. Nationals are obviously much more likely to be employed in the host Member State 
than non-nationals. Therefore, FIFA’s rules may be regarded as indirectly discriminatory 
in so far as they are less favorable than national transfer rules. 
Moreover, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP constitute non-discriminatory restrictions even when 
examined together with identical national transfer rules. As the ECJ noted in Bosman, 
Article 45 TFEU guarantees workers the right to leave their country of origin and pursue 
occupational activities of all kinds in another Member State. Any provision that precludes 
or hinders this right constitutes a restriction even if it applies without regard to 
nationality.
241
 Articles 17 and 20 RSTP do not formally prohibit players from signing 
contracts with clubs from other Member States (though Article 18(3) RSTP actually does 
include such a prohibition). All the same, in practice, players are hindered from pursuing 
employment in other Member States. The requirement to pay a sum of money and the 
threat of sporting sanctions deter players from exercising their right to free movement and 
clubs from seeking out players from other Member States.
242
  
The ECJ introduced some limitations to the scope free movement law in Keck and Graf, 
but they are not relevant in the present case. First, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP cannot be 
regarded as certain selling arrangements, for they directly affect access to another Member 
State’s labor market just like the rules in Bosman.243 Likewise, their effects are not 
otherwise too uncertain or indirect.
 
The obligation to pay a sum of money is obviously a 
very important consideration for both the club and the player regardless of whether the 
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obligation falls upon both parties, as is the case with Article 17 RSTP, or upon the club 
alone, as is the case with Article 20 RSTP.
244
 Furthermore, failure to comply with FIFA’s 
rules may result in the player being banned from official matches, possibly even 
indefinitely, and participation in official matches is a player’s most important duty as a 
worker.
245
 
The rules in Bosman applied only to out-of-contract players. In contrast, Article 17 RSTP 
applies only to in-contract players, whereas Article 20 RSTP applies to both. However, this 
distinction is irrelevant at this stage of the analysis since Article 45 TFEU applies even if 
the restriction of free movement relates to contractual obligations.
246
 Moreover, as 
discussed in section 6.1.3, compensation under Article 17 RSTP exceeds the real losses 
suffered by clubs. 
It is also important to note that Article 45 TFEU is not applicable in all individual 
situations. First and foremost, only EU/EEA and Swiss nationals have the right to free 
movement. Therefore, third-country nationals cannot rely on Article 45 TFEU to challenge 
FIFA’s rules.247 In addition, free movement law generally applies only within the territory 
of the Member States, which means that players cannot invoke the right to free movement 
when they transfer to a third country.
248
 
Furthermore, Article 45 TFEU applies only where there is an inter-State element. In 
general, an inter-State element is present when the player transfers from one Member State 
to another. On the other hand, when the player transfers within a single Member State, the 
situation is wholly internal and therefore outside the scope of free movement law.
249
 
Moreover, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP do not even apply to transfers within a single Member 
State in the first place. 
The situation is wholly internal also when the player transfers back to his country of origin. 
The ECJ ruled in Singh that workers might be deterred from leaving their country of origin 
if, upon return, they do not enjoy the same rights as when entering another Member 
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State.
250
 In the present case, however, the same rules apply regardless of whether the 
player transfers to another Member State or back to his country of origin. Consequently, 
players are deterred from leaving their country of origin because their access to another 
Member State’s labor market is restricted and not because less favorable rules apply upon 
return.
251
 
On the other hand, there is an inter-State element when the player transfers from a third 
country to a Member State that is not his country of origin. In such a situation, the player’s 
access to another Member State’s labor market is restricted. It is difficult to see why it 
should be relevant from which country the player is transferring.
252
 In contrast, when the 
player transfers back to his country of origin from a third country, the situation is quite 
obviously wholly internal, as there is no connection whatsoever to another Member State. 
All in all, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP constitute non-discriminatory restrictions at the very 
least. Article 20 RSTP in particular may also be regarded as an indirectly discriminatory 
restriction in so far as national transfer rules provide for lower training compensation. 
However, Article 45 TFEU is applicable only when an EU/EEA national or a Swiss 
national transfers to a Member State that is not his country of origin. Finally, it must be 
remembered that there is only a prima facie restriction at this stage because the legitimate 
objectives of the transfer system have yet to be taken into account. This should also be kept 
in mind when applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
6.3 Restriction of competition 
6.3.1 Defining the relevant market 
For clarity’s sake, the relevant market will be defined first even though this goes against 
the proper order of things. Because of the peculiar economics of sport, the SSNIP test is 
not very useful in defining the relevant market, and a more ad hoc type of approach is 
needed instead.
253
 Nonetheless, the SSNIP test can be used to demonstrate that different 
sports are not substitutable with each other. For example, football fans would not switch to 
basketball even if the price of football tickets were to rise, and football clubs would not 
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start recruiting basketball players even if football players were to suddenly demand higher 
salaries.
254
 
According to Egger and Stix-Hackl, there are three connected markets in professional 
sports. The exploitation market refers to the clubs and associations exploiting sporting 
contests primarily through sales of broadcasting rights, ticketing, and merchandising. 
Upstream of the exploitation market is the contest market in which the sporting contest is 
jointly produced by the clubs and organized by the associations. Upstream of the contest 
market is the supply market in which the clubs buy and sell players.
255
 
The relevant market in the present case is obviously the supply market. In principle, one 
could argue that professional players are not interchangeable from the clubs’ point of view 
because their performances are so individual. However, this argument does not hold up to 
scrutiny. Clubs do not give up completely if they are unable to recruit a certain player but 
simply recruit some other player instead.
256
  
Some might also claim that the supply market should be divided into several smaller 
markets based on, among other things, the players’ nationalities and positions. In practice, 
however, it is not possible to draw any unequivocal lines because clubs do not generally 
base their recruitment decisions on any single factor. It is entirely possible that a club 
decides to sign on a young and promising third-country national after failing to sign on an 
experienced EU national.
257
 Furthermore, it is ultimately irrelevant whether or not the 
supply market is divided into several smaller markets, as the same rules apply in any case. 
For instance, it is difficult to imagine how the same rules could have a different effect on 
the market for goalkeepers than on the market for midfielders. 
The transfer market is demonstrably global even if transfer activity is concentrated to 
Europe and South America. As a side note, it can be mentioned that Brazilians are the most 
transferred players in the world.
258
 The relevant geographic market is therefore global and 
covers the territory of all associations in which FIFA’s rules are applied.259  
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6.3.2 Classification of the parties and restrains  
In the context of the transfer system, clubs constitute undertakings, for they are 
economically active on the supply market. It is them who employ, buy, sell, and train 
players. Players are factors of production on the contest market, and their services are 
monetized on the exploitation market. Moreover, clubs can make money directly on the 
supply market by selling players to other clubs. The fact that the training of young players 
in particular also has a socio-educational function cannot change the overall conclusion 
that the transfer of players is an economic activity.
260
 
On the other hand, FIFA and the other associations do not constitute undertakings, as they 
are not engaged in economic activity on the supply market.  They carry out regulatory 
functions, but they do not employ, buy, sell, or train players.
261
 The players themselves do 
not constitute undertakings either since they are workers and, therefore, by definition, not 
independent economic actors. For the duration of their employment, workers are 
incorporated into their employers.
262
 Furthermore, it can be pointed out that the relevant 
market does not relate to the players selling their services to clubs but to the clubs selling 
players to other clubs.
263
 
Clubs are members of national associations, which in turn are members of FIFA. 
Therefore, FIFA constitutes an association of associations of undertakings, or, in other 
words, a second-level association of undertakings.
264
 The RSTP was adopted by FIFA’s 
Executive Committee in accordance with FIFA’s statutes. Consequently, the RSTP may be 
regarded as a decision by a second-level association of undertakings.
265
 It has sometimes 
been argued that the RSTP should be considered an agreement because it merely faithfully 
reflects the clubs’ wishes. However, it is ultimately irrelevant whether the RSTP is an 
agreement or a decision since Article 101 TFEU applies in the same manner in any case.
266
 
                                                 
260
 Ibid., pp. 84–85. 
261
 Miettinen and Parrish 2008, p. 111. 
262
 Opinion of AG Lenz in Bosman, para. 263; Case C-22/98 Criminal proceedings against Becu and others 
EU:C:1999:419, para. 26. 
263
 Egger and  Stix-Hackl 2002, p. 87. 
264
 ENIC, paras. 25–26; Piau, para. 112. 
265
 Egger and Stix-Hackl 2002, p. 85. See also Piau, para. 75. 
266
 Opinion of AG Lenz in Bosman, para. 258. 
 47 
 
6.3.3 Effect on trade 
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP clearly have an effect on inter-State trade, for they apply to 
international transfers, including transfers between Member States. It is fairly obvious that 
more players would transfer from one Member State to another if the contested rules did 
not exist. Furthermore, the existence of an effect on inter-State trade can be inferred from 
the fact that there is a restriction on the free movement of workers.
267
 
Moreover, inter-State trade is affected also because clubs are hindered from carrying out 
cross-border activities on the contest and exploitation markets.
268
 The logic behind this is 
that restraints on player mobility prevent clubs from building their teams in the best 
possible way. As a result, they are also hindered from improving their sporting 
performance and thereby from exploiting that performance.
269
  
The effect on trade is without a doubt appreciable. Articles 17 and 20 RSTP are legally 
binding on all clubs, that is to say, all undertakings on the relevant market.
270
 Likewise, the 
contested rules apply to all in-contract players and all young players. It is self-evident that, 
at any given time, the majority of players are bound by a valid contract and that the number 
of free agents is small in comparison.
271
 Young players also make up a considerable 
portion of all players since players generally have relatively short careers. Finally, it can be 
pointed out that European clubs spend a few billions on transfers each year.
272
 
FIFA’s training compensation scheme is currently poorly enforced,273 and only 20.7 
million dollars were paid in training compensation in 2015.
274
 Some might therefore claim 
that Article 20 RSTP cannot be considered to have an appreciable effect on trade. 
However, Article 20 RSTP probably still has a significant deterrent effect in practice, for 
clubs cannot completely rule out the possibility of having to pay training compensation. 
They can never be absolutely sure that they are able to game the system and avoid paying 
training compensation. 
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In the context of transfers from third countries, there is an effect on inter-State trade 
because the transfer system reduces the supply of third-country players within the EU. If 
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP did not exist, more third-country players would transfer to the EU 
and, subsequently, within the EU. Because European clubs employ a large number of third-
country nationals, the effect on trade appears to be appreciable.
275
  
In the context of transfers to third countries, inter-State trade is affected at least in so far 
third-country clubs are hindered from carrying out economic activities within the EU. For 
example, it can be mentioned that Russian clubs take part in UEFA competitions organized 
within the EU. Moreover, inter-State trade is affected if trade to third-countries is increased 
at the cost of trade within the EU.
276
 This is clearly not the case with Article 17 RSTP 
because it applies in the same way regardless of where a player transfers to. On the other 
hand, training compensation under Article 20 RSTP is lower for transfers to non-UEFA 
countries than for transfers between UEFA countries.
277
 As a result, clubs probably do not 
want to sell their players to non-UEFA countries, but out-of-contract players will find it 
more attractive to transfer to non-UEFA countries.  Be that as it may, the effect on trade 
might not be appreciable in this context. It would appear that third country-clubs do not 
carry out large-scale activities within the EU. Likewise, it seems unlikely that the 
differential treatment under Article 20 RSTP really has an effect on the flow of transfers. 
Naturally, more information is needed before making any definitive conclusions. 
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP do not apply when a player transfers within a single Member 
State. Nevertheless, as a side note, it can be mentioned that the transfer rules of national 
associations may still have an effect on inter-State trade.
278
 
6.3.4 Applicability of Article 101 TFEU 
The first step in applying Article 101 TFEU is to determine whether there is a restriction 
by object. It is fairly obvious that the restriction of competition is in fact intended by FIFA 
and the clubs.
279
 When they argue that Article 17 RSTP is needed to ensure competitive 
balance, they are effectively saying that competition for players must be restricted because 
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otherwise the richest clubs would hire all the best players and dominate competitions. On 
the other hand, the whole idea behind Article 20 RSTP is that competition for young 
players must be restricted because otherwise clubs would be deterred from investing in 
training. 
Ultimately, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP may be regarded as restrictions by object because 
they reveal such a degree of harm that there is no need to consider their effects in detail.
280
 
The contested rules replace the normal system of supply and demand with a uniform 
mechanism wherein clubs buy and sell players.
281
 Unlike employers in other industries, 
clubs cannot compete for employees by simply offering higher salaries. Instead, they have 
to pay their competitors in order to secure an employee’s services. 
In any case, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP constitute restrictions by effect at the very least. 
Using the language of Article 101 TFEU, the two provisions share sources of supply, for 
they narrow the pool of players that can be freely recruited. In the counterfactual, if the 
transfer system did not exist, clubs could sign on any young out-of-contract player without 
having to pay anything at all to the player’s former club. Likewise, clubs could freely sign 
on any in-contract player, though they would have to take into account that the player 
might be sued for breach of contract.
282
 In addition, as noted in the previous section, 
restrictive effects on the supply market reverberate downstream. Articles 17 and 20 RSTP 
restrict competition also on the grounds that they hinder clubs from developing their 
economic activities on the contest and exploitation markets.
283
  
Article 17 and 20 RSTP appear neutral at first, but, in practice, they do not affect all clubs 
in the same way. Unlike small clubs, big clubs can often afford to pay transfer fees and 
training compensation.
284
 For example, it can be mentioned that the top 20 clubs accounted 
for 28% of all transfer spending in Europe in 2014.
285
 Admittedly, small clubs would not 
be able to hire the best players even if the transfer system was abolished because they 
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cannot afford to pay the high salaries demanded by those players. Nonetheless, Articles 17 
and 20 RSTP still further strengthen the position of rich clubs.
286
  
Moreover, clubs cannot always successfully sign on a player even if they are willing to pay 
the market price. In particular, clubs might want to turn down offers that would see their 
best player transfer to their biggest rival.
287
 Recruiting the player anyway is not a realistic 
option during the protected period, as both the club and the player would face serious 
sporting sanctions. Under normal competition, clubs could not automatically prevent their 
players from being recruited by other clubs. 
Commentators rarely discuss what effects FIFA’s transfer rules have on consumers even 
though consumer welfare is arguably the most important goal of EU competition law. This 
is understandable, as it is difficult to demonstrate any direct consumer harm.
288
 
Nonetheless, competition is still restricted because the competitive process is undermined. 
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP prevent clubs from improving and, therefore, in a sense locks 
them in their existing positions.
289
 
Likewise, market integration is still an important goal of EU competition law. While it is 
difficult to argue that the contested rules have the object of partitioning national markets, 
Article 20 RSTP in particular has such an effect in so far as national transfer rules are more 
favorable. If international transfers are more expensive than domestic transfers, clubs will 
prefer to recruit players from the same Member State. Accordingly, differential treatment 
of international and domestic transfers causes the supply market to become more 
segmented.
290
 
FIFA’s rules also suppress player salaries. In the current system, the total value of a 
player’s services is a combination of the salary paid to the player and the transfer fee and 
training compensation paid to the player’s former club. If clubs did not have to pay 
anything to the player’s former club, they would surely be willing to pay higher salaries.291 
In other words, the transfer system is effectively a way for clubs to gain extra profits at the 
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players’ expense.292 However, since players are not competitors, customers, or consumers, 
this finding is ultimately not relevant.
293
  
As for appreciability, the same arguments that were presented in the previous section apply 
here as well. In particular, it can be noted that competition is restricted in respect to the 
overwhelming majority of players. Clubs have only limited alternative sources of supply in 
the form of old out-of-contract players.
294
 
In SETCA, the Commission argued that FIFA’s new rules on contractual stability did not 
have an appreciable effect on competition because of their limited scope.
295
 The 
Commission presumably meant to reference to the fact that players may terminate their 
contracts after the protected period. The Commission’s reasoning was perhaps valid at the 
time but can no longer be accepted. Because the CAS now applies the positive interest 
principle, unilateral termination is almost impossible even after the protected period. 
Therefore, Article 17 RSTP cannot be said to be limited in scope in any meaningful way. 
Finally, the RSTP does not fall outside the scope of Article 101 TFEU by virtue of 
constituting a collective bargaining agreement.
296
 First, the RSTP cannot be considered a 
result of negotiations between workers and employers. FIFPro’s participation was 
inconsistent, and, the RSTP is therefore better described as an agreement between FIFA 
and the Commission. Second, the RSTP does not have the overall effect of improving the 
players’ working conditions.297 The benefits that players derive from contractual stability 
and increased investment in training are outweighed by the fact that the RSTP suppresses 
salaries and reduces international mobility. 
To sum up, Article 17 and 20 RSTP restrict competition by both object and effect, for they 
share sources of supply. It is worth mentioning that the player’s nationality is not a relevant 
consideration under competition law. Therefore, unlike Article 45 TFEU, Article 101 
TFEU (and Article 102 TFEU) can be invoked even if the player is a third-country national 
or transferring back to his country of origin.  
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6.3.5 Applicability of Article 102 TFEU 
The first step in applying Article 102 TFEU is to establish dominance. At a cursory glance, 
it might seem like FIFA clearly has some kind of dominant position. After all, FIFA has a 
regulatory monopoly on the organization of football. All the same, Article 102 TFEU 
applies only to undertakings, and, as previously noted, FIFA does not constitute an 
undertaking on the supply market.
298
  
However, the discussion does not end here because there is still the possibility that clubs 
are collectively dominant. Moreover, in Piau, the GC introduced the idea that FIFA 
operates through its members. Therefore, if clubs are collectively dominant, then FIFA 
may also be regarded as an undertaking and a part of the collectively dominant entity 
together with the clubs.
299
 
Be that as it may, further analysis appears unnecessary because there can be no abuse in 
any case. Abuse refers to unilateral action that a dominant undertaking has taken against its 
competitors, its customers, or the consumers.
300
 As AG Lenz noted in Bosman, in adopting 
rules that restrain player mobility, clubs have restricted competition among themselves, but 
they have not taken unilateral action against any other relevant party. Clubs have acted 
unilaterally in relation to players, but players are not competitors, customers, or 
consumers.
301
 
However, this line of thinking is only valid if all clubs are regarded as dominant. If only a 
small group of elite clubs is dominant, then the other clubs may be seen as competitors 
and, therefore, potential subjects of abuse. Consequently, elite clubs are abusing their 
dominant position if they force FIFA to adopt rules that serve only their economic interests 
to the detriment of others.
302
  
The next question is therefore whether elite clubs possess sufficient economic strength to 
be considered dominant. With the information available, it is impossible to make any 
definitive conclusions. However, it is possible to make some tentative observations. 
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All in all, a fair amount of evidence suggests that some group of elite clubs could very well 
have sufficient economic strength to be considered dominant.
303
 In 2014, a total of 716 
clubs played in European top-division leagues.
304
 As mentioned before, the top 20 clubs 
were responsible for 28% of all transfer spending. In addition, the revenues of the top 30 
clubs accounted for 48% of the total.
305
 It can also be pointed out that elite clubs dominate 
competitions all over Europe and exert considerable influence on FIFA and UEFA.
306
 In 
particular, it can be mentioned that FIFA was forced to amend its player release rules after 
elite clubs threatened to break away from UEFA competitions.
307
 Moreover, if elite clubs 
really do have a dominant position, then that position is obviously held within a substantial 
part of the internal market, perhaps within the whole EU. 
As the term suggests, collective dominance requires that the undertakings concerned 
present themselves or act together as a collective entity.
308
 In this context, some might 
point out that elite clubs have largely opposing interests on the supply market. After all, 
they all want to buy players from other clubs for as little as possible and sell their own 
players for as much as possible.
309
 However, forcing FIFA to adopt the RSTP would 
certainly count as an instance of acting together as a collective entity. 
Collective dominance also requires that the undertakings concerned are joined by sufficient 
economic links or factors.
310
 More specific criteria were set out in Airtours: there must be a 
lack of competitive pressure from outsiders, mechanisms for retaliation, and a sufficient 
degree of market transparency.
311
 These criteria would appear to be satisfied in the present 
case. The RSTP is binding on not only the elite clubs themselves but also on all of their 
competitors, and anyone who fails to comply will be subjected to serious sanctions.
312
 Elite 
clubs are also linked by virtue of being members of the European Club Association. This 
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representative organization for UEFA clubs has a relatively broad membership but, in 
practice, mostly serves the elite clubs’ interests.313   
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP constitute exclusionary abuse, for they create barriers of entry 
and expansion. First of all, both provisions obviously raise the cost of building a 
competitive team.
314
 Moreover, Article 17 RSTP in particular allows elite clubs to 
monopolize the best players. It seems likely that, at any given time, the majority of the best 
players are employed by elite clubs. Because unilateral termination of contract is almost 
impossible in practice, other clubs cannot lure players away by simply offering higher 
wages. Instead, they have to hope that elite clubs are willing to sell their players.
315
 As a 
result, smaller clubs will find it difficult to compete with elite clubs on the contest and 
exploitation markets. 
Finally, it must be noted that the RSTP itself constitutes abuse only if its adoption or 
continued existence can be attributed to the elite clubs unduly influencing FIFA. Therefore, 
it is difficult to construe any abuse if other clubs generally do not want to see the RSTP 
abolished. While dominant undertakings have a special responsibility not to let their 
conduct distort competition, it seems unreasonable to require elite clubs to act as nannies 
for other clubs. If multiple undertakings enter willingly into a restrictive agreement without 
being pressured to do so, a dominant undertaking is not abusing its position just because 
other undertakings are acting against their own best interests in some respects. In such a 
situation, there is obviously collusion but no unilateral conduct.
316
 Again, with the 
information available, it is not possible to make any definitive conclusions. However, it 
can be pointed out that there would appear that there is no large-scale movement to abolish 
the RSTP among the clubs.  
In conclusion, Article 102 TFEU might be applicable, but more information is needed. In 
particular, it remains uncertain whether elite clubs are really dominant and whether they 
have acted unilaterally or merely colluded with the other clubs. It is also submitted that 
construing the situation in the manner presented above feels quite awkward and even 
somewhat forced. Therefore, the Commission might focus only on Article 101 TFEU if it 
decides to pursue FIFPro’s complaint. 
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6.4 Existence of legitimate objectives 
6.4.1 Competitive balance and financial solidarity  
Competitive balance, or, to be more accurate, “maintaining a balance between clubs by 
preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty as to results,” was accepted as a 
legitimate objective in Bosman.
317
 However, defending the current system on the grounds 
of competitive balance seems doomed from the start. Just like the rules in Bosman, Articles 
17 and 20 RSTP do not “preclude the richest clubs from securing the services of the best 
players nor prevent the availability of financial resources from being a decisive factor in 
competitive sport.”318 Moreover, as discussed in section 5.2, evidence suggests that the 
transfer system actually undermines competitive balance or, at best, only has a marginal 
positive effect. 
Be that as it may, as likewise discussed in section 5.2, the transfer system does redistribute 
money from rich to poor clubs and thereby ensures the financial survival of many small 
clubs. Ensuring the financial survival of small clubs is surely a legitimate objective on its 
own. For example, the ECJ noted in Bernard that small clubs in particular perform 
important social and cultural functions.
319
 The Commission has also recognized “the 
importance of an equitable redistribution of income between clubs, including the smallest 
ones.”320  
This issue was actually briefly touched upon in Bosman as well. UEFA argued that transfer 
fees played an important role in the financing of small and medium-sized clubs, but this 
argument was rejected because it had been submitted too late. However, the ECJ still went 
on to examine the merits of this argument.
321
 There would have been no need to do so if 
UEFA’s claims had nothing to do with legitimate objectives. 
Consequently, the transfer system should not be defended under the guise of competitive 
balance. The term invokes an image of an equilibrium in which a significant number of 
clubs have a realistic chance of winning. As suggested by Pijetlovic, the objective at stake 
should be renamed as “preserving the social functions of football in general, and ensuring 
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the financial survival of smaller clubs in particular.”322 Hereafter, the term financial 
solidarity will be used when referring to this objective. 
6.4.2 Encouraging the recruitment and training of young players 
The ECJ readily accepted encouraging the recruitment and training of young players as a 
legitimate objective in both Bosman and Bernard.
323
 However, such an objective would 
probably not be accepted in most other industries.
324
 Therefore, it is necessary to examine 
why sport is different. 
As the ECJ noted in Bernard, not all young players will ultimately continue on as 
professionals. Therefore, training costs are often not compensated by the value of the 
services rendered by the player.
325
 Likewise, employee poaching is likely a bigger problem 
in professional football than in other industries because a player’s ability is immediately 
visible on the pitch.
326
 
Nevertheless, similar considerations apply in other industries as well. For example, not 
every trainee sales person will be able to generate enough sales to cover his or her salary in 
the end. Moreover, a musician’s ability can be gauged by listening to him or her play. 
Finally, clubs need employees to function just like all other employers. They would have to 
recruit and train players in any case in order to survive.
327
 
Consequently, the peculiar economics of sport do not completely explain why sport is 
treated differently in this context. However, in both Bosman and Bernard, the ECJ linked 
the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players to the socio-
educational function of sport.
328
 Consequently, it would appear that the ECJ considers this 
socio-educational function to be so important that it is permissible to encourage clubs to 
train more players than they would from a purely business point of view. Otherwise, too 
few young people would be able to partake in the positive effects of sport.
329
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6.4.3 Contractual stability and team stability 
Contractual stability is quite clearly a legitimate objective under EU law even if neither the 
ECJ nor the Commission has expressly said so. After all, it is difficult to imagine how the 
Member States’ economies could function if contracts could be broken at any time without 
any consequences. Be that as it may, it is necessary to examine why there is a need for 
enhanced contractual stability in professional football. After all, other employees are 
typically free to terminate their contracts as long as they pay for the resulting damages.
330
 
In SETCA, the Commission accepted that restricting a player’s ability to unilaterally 
terminate his contract could be justified on the grounds of ensuring team stability. Team 
stability is needed in order to guarantee the integrity of championships and the regularity of 
competitions. If players could change clubs freely, the composition of teams could change 
dramatically during the course of championships. As a result, the comparability of results 
between different teams could be called into question. Moreover, if players could leave at 
any time, clubs might have to field haphazardly put together teams or be unable to field 
one at all. Matches might have to be cancelled and organizing championships would 
become quite difficult.
331
 Similar arguments were also presented in Lehtonen in the context 
of transfer windows (the periods of the year during which players are allowed to 
transfer).
332
 
In addition, fans also have an interest in team stability. They identify with their favorite 
team and would be angry to see their favorite player walk out after receiving a more 
lucrative offer from a rival club.
333
 Be that as it may, this argument is quite dubious, as fan 
interest appears to be least of the football industry’s problems. Match attendance has 
continued to grow even though there is nowadays less team stability than ever.
334
  
Some might argue that the objective of contractual stability goes beyond team stability. 
This may be true, but the problem with Article 17 RSTP is that it promotes only one-sided 
contractual stability. In practice, unilateral termination of contract is not a viable option for 
players. On the other hand, clubs can always just transfer away any unwanted players. 
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While a player can refuse to be transferred, clubs have many ways of forcing players to 
cooperate. For example, clubs can just bench any antagonistic players, and being benched 
for an extended period of time can be very damaging for a player’s career. In addition, 
compensation is calculated in a way that is punitive to players but not to clubs.
335
 As 
discussed in section 6.1.3, this differential treatment cannot be explained away by claiming 
that the loss of a transfer fee is something clubs should be compensated for. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that Article 17 RSTP does not pursue contractual stability as a 
public policy objective. Instead, Article 17 RSTP promotes one-sided contractual stability 
and mostly serves the clubs’ economic interests. Therefore, because purely economic aims 
are not acceptable under free movement law, the contractual stability argument must be 
rejected. In principle, one-sided contractual stability could perhaps produce economic 
efficiencies within the meaning of competition law. However, this idea will not be 
entertained any further since Article 17 RSTP would still have to be justified in some other 
way under free movement law. 
6.5 Applicable justification method 
Now that it has been established that Articles 17 and 20 RSTP pursue legitimate 
objectives, the next step is to determine which justification method is applicable. First of 
all, it is obvious that the contested rules are not purely sporting rules. They do not relate to 
the particular nature and context of certain competitions, for they apply to all international 
transfers.  
As for inherency, in UEFA Champions League, the joint selling of broadcasting rights was 
not regarded as an inherent restriction because it was not “an indispensable prerequisite for 
the redistribution of revenue.” 336 The exact same logic applies in the present case. 
Transfer-related payments are not indispensable prerequisites for ensuring financial 
solidarity or encouraging the recruitment and training of young players. There are plenty of 
other methods of redistributing revenue between clubs. 
On the other hand, some restrictions on unilateral termination of contract could perhaps be 
regarded as inherent, for it is difficult to see how sufficient team stability could be 
guaranteed otherwise. Be that as it may, Article 17 RSTP is clearly not inherent in its 
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current form. In the worst case scenario, a player in breach of contract can face a lifelong 
ban from all football-related activities. It is plain as day that that professional football 
could survive even if unilateral termination resulted in less severe sanctions.
337
 
Consequently, under free movement law, Articles 17 and 20 RSTP must be justified under 
the imperative requirements doctrine. This was the case in both Bosman and Bernard.
338
 
On the other hand, under competition law, the contested rules must be justified under the 
efficiency defense. In SETCA, the Commission actually expressly examined whether 
FIFA’s new rules on contractual stability, that is to say Article 17 RSTP, qualified for an 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.
339
 Moreover, the Commission is of the opinion that 
transfer rules in general (apart from transfer windows) must be exempted under Article 
101(3) TFEU.
340
  
6.6 Existence of efficiencies 
Because Articles 17 and 20 RSTP must be exempted under the efficiency defense, it is 
necessary to determine whether the previously mentioned public policy objectives can be 
construed as efficiencies within the meaning of competition law. 
First of all, it is submitted that financial solidarity increases product variety. If fewer clubs 
go bankrupt, a greater number of clubs will be able to take part in championships. The 
logic behind this is that consumers’ interest in football goes beyond elite level football. 
Consumers also want to support their local clubs even if they might never win any titles.
341
  
In UEFA Champions League, the Commission accepted that encouraging the recruitment 
and training of young players can be said to improve production of sport.
342
 The 
Commission did not really elaborate, but it seems logical that more investment in training 
results in more skillful players and, therefore, more exciting matches.
343
 In other words, 
increased investment in training produces higher quality products. 
                                                 
337
 Parrish 2015, pp. 273–274. 
338
 Bosman, para. 104; Bernard, para. 38. See also SETCA, para. 54. 
339
 SETCA, para. 55. 
340
 Commission Staff Working Document on Sport, para. 3.4. 
341
 Jemson 2013, p. 44.  
342
 UEFA Champions League, paras. 131 and 164–165. 
343
 See Terviö 2006, p. 969. 
 60 
 
In SETCA, the Commission argued that team stability improves the production of sport.
344
 
Again, the Commission did not really explain its reasoning, but it is not too difficult to see 
why the Commission was right. Matches are more exciting if clubs are able plan for the 
season and field carefully put together teams. Additionally, entire championships are more 
exciting if the results are comparable. 
6.7 Proportionality 
6.7.1 Suitability and necessity 
Financial solidarity 
As discussed in section 5.2, the transfer system demonstrably redistributes money from 
rich to poor clubs and thereby ensures the financial survival of small clubs. However, only 
transfer fees (but not training compensation payments) have a notable effect on the overall 
balance of funds between clubs. Therefore, only Article 17 RSTP (but not Article 20 
RSTP) may be regarded as a suitable means of ensuring financial solidarity. 
The next step is to examine whether Article 17 RSTP is necessary. Article 101(3) TFEU in 
particular requires that the parties could not have achieved the same results on their own.
345
 
It seems obvious that some form of collusion between clubs is necessary. It is difficult to 
imagine how clubs could ensure financial solidarity by acting completely independently 
from each other. 
Be that as it may, there are other methods of redistributing revenue that are not directly 
related to the transfer of players. Perhaps the most common suggestion is that FIFA could 
devise some sort of internal taxation scheme.
346
 In particular, FIFA could set up a 
solidarity fund to which clubs would be required to contribute a certain percentage of their 
revenue. 
347
 
Internal taxation would be not only a less restrictive but also a more suitable alternative to 
transfer fees. The system could be tailored to specifically target small clubs that are on the 
brink of bankruptcy. In contrast, transfer fees only have a haphazard redistributive effect. 
Desirable redistribution occurs only when a poor club discovers a talented player who is 
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then transferred to a rich club for a handsome transfer fee.  The discovery of a talented 
player is largely a matter of chance, and, moreover, no transfer fee can be claimed if the 
player decides to sit out his contract.
348
 In addition, the highest transfer fees are usually 
paid between rich clubs, in which case transfer fees do not contribute towards the objective 
of financial solidarity in any meaningful way. 
Nonetheless, internal taxation might not necessarily have the desired results. 
Microeconomic theory suggests that revenue sharing between clubs dulls the incentive to 
invest in players. Higher revenue clubs are discouraged from investing because a part of 
their revenue is redistributed to their competitors. On the other hand, lower revenue clubs 
are discouraged from investing because they will receive less money if they actually 
manage to win and thereby increase their revenue. Competitive balance is also weakened 
because this dulling effect is greater for lower revenue clubs.
349
  
However, the abovementioned is true only if clubs are profit-maximizers, and it would 
appear that European clubs – unlike their American counterparts – are actually win-
maximizers. European clubs want to win at all costs even if losing would be more 
profitable. This win-maximizing mentality can be explained by the fact that European 
leagues operate on the basis of promotion and relegation. Losing can result in relegation to 
a lower league, and relegation generally involves a huge loss of profits.
350
  
In win-maximizing leagues, revenue sharing through internal taxation would actually 
improve competitive balance. Lower revenue clubs would not just pocket the money but 
spend it on improving their performance.
351
 Furthermore, the system could be designed in 
a way to deter complacency. For example, money could be distributed only on the 
condition that the recipient invests it in the training of young players.
352
 
In conclusion, Article 17 RSTP is not a necessary means of ensuring financial solidarity 
since internal taxation could achieve the same results. Unfortunately, getting rich clubs to 
agree to internal taxation might prove difficult. Nonetheless, less restrictive alternatives do 
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not cease to exist just because the parties are unwilling to implement them for some reason 
or another.
353
 
Encouraging the recruitment and training of young players 
In Bosman, the ECJ outright rejected the idea that transfer fees could be a suitable means 
of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players. Its reasoning was as follows: 
[B]ecause it is impossible to predict the sporting future of young players with any 
certainty and because only a limited number of such players go on to play professionally, 
those fees are by nature contingent and uncertain and are in any event unrelated to the 
actual cost borne by clubs of training both future professional players and those who will 
never play professionally. The prospect of receiving such fees cannot, therefore, be 
either a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young players or an 
adequate means of financing such activities, particularly in the case of smaller clubs.
354
  
However, the ECJ changed its mind in Bernard: 
[C]lubs which provided the training could be discouraged from investing in the training 
of young players if they could not obtain reimbursement of the amounts spent for that 
purpose where, at the end of his training, a player enters into a professional contract 
with another club . . . It follows that a scheme providing for the payment of compensation 
for training where a young player, at the end of his training, signs a professional 
contract with a club other than the one which trained him can, in principle, be justified 
by the objective of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players.
355
 
Accordingly, the ECJ now accepts that training compensation schemes may in principle be 
suitable. Interestingly, the ECJ talked about encouraging in Bosman, whereas it talked 
about not discouraging in Bernard. It would therefore appear that the standard of suitability 
has been lowered. Commentators have traced this change back to the Lisbon Treaty and 
Article 165 TFEU.
356
  
In this context, the ECJ has only ever talked about schemes that provide reimbursement for 
training costs. However, there are other means of achieving the same objective. As 
discussed in section 5.2, Article 17 RSTP gives clubs incentives to invest in training by 
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ensuring that long-term contracts are enforceable. Moreover, it would appear that even the 
most intricate of training compensation schemes could not replicate the effects of 
enforceable long-term contracts.
357
 Accordingly, Article 17 RSTP may be regarded as not 
only suitable but also necessary. 
On the other hand, the training compensation scheme laid out in Article 20 RSTP is clearly 
the type of scheme the ECJ was talking about in Bernard. Be that as it may, as mentioned 
in section 6.3.3, the training compensation scheme is poorly enforced, and only 20.7 
million dollars were paid in training compensation in 2015. 20.7 million dollars spread 
throughout the whole world cannot have anything other than a minimal impact on the 
recruitment and training of young players. Consequently, Article 20 RSTP cannot be 
regarded as suitable. As the ECJ noted in Bernard, a training compensation scheme must 
actually be capable of achieving its purported objective.
358
 Nonetheless, for completeness’ 
sake, the analysis will not be stopped here. 
In principle, clubs could try to recover training costs by inserting payback clauses into 
player contracts.
359
 However, payback clauses mimicking Article 20 RSTP would usually 
be unenforceable in national courts due to a plethora of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, 
payback clauses apply, by definition, only when an employment relationship is 
prematurely terminated. In contrast, under Article 20 RSTP, compensation is payable even 
if the player’s contract has expired. 
While some form of collusion would therefore appear necessary, there are less restrictive 
alternatives. Again, revenue could be redistributed through internal taxation. FIFA could 
set up a training compensation fund to which clubs would have to contribute a certain 
percentage of their total salary expenditure. Training compensation would then be doled 
out whenever a player signs his first professional contract or transfers to another club. As a 
result, the link between individual transfers and the obligation to pay training 
compensation would be severed. Young players could transfer freely, and clubs could 
freely recruit young players.
360
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This type of training compensation fund would give clubs the same incentive to invest in 
players as the current scheme, for clubs would receive compensation under the same 
conditions as in the current scheme.  The only difference would be that training 
compensation would be paid for by all clubs instead of just the new club. In particular, 
FIFA could easily scrounge up 20.7 million dollars and set up a training compensation 
fund that achieves the same minimal results as the current scheme. For example, it can be 
pointed out that UEFA distributed 85 million euros of the 2014/2015 Champions League 
revenue for use in youth development.
361
  
Because there was no need to do so, the ECJ did not address the issue of less restrictive 
alternatives in Bernard. However, many commentators have also ignored this issue when 
discussing Article 20 RSTP.
362
 This is quite odd since the ECJ did reference to less 
restrictive alternatives in Bosman.
363
 Accepting Article 20 RSTP as proportionate despite 
the existence of less restrictive alternatives would imply a revolutionization of EU sports 
law. The principle of proportionality would no longer have the same importance in the 
sports sector as in other sectors. 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that FIFA’s training compensation scheme is 
indirectly discriminatory when examined together with national schemes that provide for 
lower training compensation. This means that it is not enough that this particular type of 
training compensation scheme is necessary. There must also be a reason why an indirectly 
discriminatory training compensation scheme is necessary.
364
 
Indirect discrimination arising from actual differences in training costs would surely be 
acceptable, but this is clearly not the case with Article 20 RSTP. Training costs do not 
magically increase when a player transfers to another Member State, nor is there any other 
reason why clubs should be entitled to higher training compensation when a player 
transfers internationally.  
It seems obvious that there is no malicious discriminatory intent behind the differential 
treatment of domestic and international transfer. For example, Finnish clubs simply cannot 
afford to pay a minimum of 10,000 euros for each transfer of a young player. In 2016, the 
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richest club in the Finnish top league Veikkausliiga had a salary budget of just 1.3 million 
euros.
365
 Be that as it may, this is no justification for discrimination. There are many clubs 
in other Member States that are in the same financial position as Finnish clubs. There is no 
reason why those clubs should have to pay higher training compensation than Finnish 
clubs when they recruit a player trained in Finland. 
This problem could be solved if the pre-determined compensation sums were set by 
national associations instead of continental associations.
 366
 In order to avoid unjustified 
indirect discrimination, compensation would have to be the same regardless of whether the 
player transfers within a single Member State or to another Member State. Nonetheless, 
from the clubs’ point of view, international transfers could still often be more expensive 
than domestic transfers. However, the differential treatment would be based on the fact that 
the cost of training is higher in some countries than others. Admittedly, this type of scheme 
would also be more complicated than the current scheme since clubs would not be neatly 
divided into just four categories. All the same, administrative convenience cannot justify 
restrictions.
367
 
To sum up, Article 17 RSTP is a suitable and necessary means of encouraging the 
recruitment and training of young players because the incentivizing effect of enforceable 
long-term contracts cannot be replicated through other means. On the other hand, Article 
20 RSTP is neither suitable nor necessary. FIFA’s training compensation scheme is poorly 
enforced and indirectly discriminatory, and the same results could be achieved through 
internal taxation. 
Team Stability 
Article 17 RSTP effectively deters unilateral termination of contract and therefore appears 
to be a suitable means of ensuring team stability. However, it is necessary to make a 
distinction between, on one hand, the integrity of championships and, on the other hand, 
the regularity of competitions. 
The integrity argument rings somewhat hollow. The integrity of championships is 
endangered whenever a player transfers during the season regardless of whether his 
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contract was terminated unilaterally or upon mutual agreement.
368
 FIFA does very little to 
prevent the transfers of in-contract players from skewing the results of championships. In 
general, the number of mid-season transfers is not limited, and, therefore, clubs could in 
principle replace their whole team during the mid-season transfer window.
369
  
Moreover, it is clear that Article 17 RSTP is not necessary to ensure the integrity of 
championships. There is no need to sanction unilateral termination with a worldwide ban. 
When the player transfers to another league, there is no danger of the player facing off 
against his old team. Therefore, it would suffice to prevent players from playing for more 
than one club in the same league during the same season.
370
 
On the other hand, the regularity of competitions is endangered whenever a player 
unilaterally terminates his contract regardless of where he subsequently transfers to. The 
only thing that matters is that clubs can plan for the season without players suddenly 
leaving. If a club wants to transfer away some of its players, then so be it. 
In principle, clubs could try to replicate the effects of Article 17 RSTP by introducing non-
competition and liquidated damages clauses into player contracts. The problem is that 
these clauses would often be unenforceable in national courts. For example, under Finnish 
law, non-competition clauses may be introduced only for a “particularly weighty 
reason.”371 Such a reason does not usually exist because players do not generally possess 
any trade secrets or receive any special training (in comparison to other players).
372
 
Moreover, liquidated damages clauses would be fairly useless since, under Finnish law, 
employees cannot be required to pay liquidated damages that exceed real damages.
373
 
Some might argue that Article 17 RSTP should not be considered lawful under EU law if 
similar restrictions are not lawful under national contract laws. However, due the seasonal 
nature of sport, clubs do have a unique need for contractual stability that other employers 
do not generally have. Accordingly, this argument related to national laws cannot be 
accepted. 
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While some restrictions on unilateral termination appear necessary, it needs to be 
examined whether the individual details of Article 17 RSTP are also necessary. Depending 
on the country and competition, the football season usually lasts approximately eight to ten 
months. Therefore, it is easy accept a protected period of one year. Moreover, an absolute 
prohibition on unilateral termination during the season would also appear necessary. Such 
a prohibition is already contained in Article 16 RSTP.
374
  
However, Article 17 RSTP provides for a protected period of two or three years. In 
SETCA, the Commission argued that the protected period is proportionate because of the 
specificities of the sports sector.
375
 However, it is not immediately apparent what these 
specificities are, especially when taking into account the apparent short-termism of modern 
football.
376
 On the contrary, it could be argued that Article 17 RSTP actually undermines 
team-building in the long run. Instead of assembling cohesive teams, small clubs are often 
forced to sell their best players in order avoid bankruptcy.
377
 Furthermore, long-term team-
building could be achieved by using the carrot instead of the stick. For example, clubs 
could encourage players to respect their contracts by offering loyalty bonuses.
378
 All in all, 
it is up to FIFA and the clubs to demonstrate why a protected period of more than one year 
is necessary. 
In addition, there is the issue of high compensation. It seems likely that sporting sanctions 
alone would be enough to deter unilateral termination during the protected period, though 
FIFA could perhaps prove otherwise. Therefore, there is no reason why compensation 
should be punitive in character. Moreover, punitive compensation does not serve any 
legitimate purpose outside the protected period. The integrity of championships or the 
regularity of competition is not endangered in any way if the player terminates his contract 
after one year (or a few years if a longer protected period is deemed acceptable).
379
 
In conclusion, Article 17 RSTP is not a necessary means of achieving team stability in its 
current form. However, a protected period of one year, including the related sporting 
sanctions, can be accepted as necessary. 
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6.7.2 Proportionality stricto sensu 
Article 17 RSTP 
Thus far, it has been established that Article 17 RSTP is a suitable and necessary means of 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players. The next question is whether 
the positives outweigh the negatives. First of all, it is pointed out that it is not really 
possible to quantify the positive effects of Article 17 RSTP. The only thing that can be said 
is that clubs would be much less willing to invest young players if they could leave at any 
time. 
On the other hand, it is apparent that Article 17 RSTP constitutes a very serious restriction 
on the free movement of workers. In principle, players are free to transfer to other Member 
States after their contract expires, but, in practice, many players never get to this point. A 
football players’ career is relatively short and probably last only about 10–15 years. 
Therefore, because player contracts may last up to five years, a player might be bound to 
the same employer for one third of his career. Furthermore, clubs will often want to 
transfer away a player before his contract expires in order to secure a transfer fee. The 
player can refuse but might find himself in a difficult situation as a result.
380
 Additionally, 
player contracts can often include unilateral extension options, though the CAS and the 
FIFA DRC do not generally accept such clauses as valid.
381
 
Quantifying the harm to competition is slightly trickier. In particular, it is difficult to say 
how consumers are affected. Increased investment in training results in higher quality 
matches, but the transfer system also further strengthens the position of big clubs, which is 
obviously quite negative in the long run. More pressingly, however, it is clear that Article 
17 RTSP has a very negative effect on the competitive process. The transfer system makes 
it is very difficult for small clubs to improve their performance. They cannot freely seek 
out better players and, instead, must to pay their competitors in order to secure a player’s 
services. 
It is also difficult to ignore that the ECJ has consistently insisted that compensation must 
be related to actual training costs.
382
 The obligation to pay training compensation is a 
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relatively minor restriction in comparison to Article 17 RSTP. Once training compensation 
has been paid, the player is free for the rest of his career. On the other hand, players are 
free from the effects of Article 17 RSTP only rarely when they are, for a very short 
moment, not bound by a valid contract. Moreover, from the clubs’ point of view, Article 
17 RSTP narrows the pool of freely recruitable players much more than the obligation to 
pay training compensation. 
Likewise, it can be pointed out that the pre-Bosman transfer system surely gave clubs even 
more incentive to invest in training, as players were never free to leave. If the pre-Bosman 
transfer system was disproportionate, then why would current transfer system be 
proportionate? This question cannot be answered by simply pointing out that out-of-
contract players can nowadays transfer freely because, as discussed above, some players 
might never reach the point of free agency. 
Moreover, in SETCA, the Commission expressly rejected rules that completely prohibited 
unilateral termination. FIFA’s new rules were accepted on the condition that unilateral 
termination is permitted outside the protected period. However, because the CAS now 
applies the positive interest principle, unilateral termination is virtually impossible even 
outside the protected period. Therefore, it can be assumed that the Commission would not 
have given its blessing to FIFA’s new rules if it had known how they would come to be 
applied by the CAS.
383
 
Enforceable long-term contracts would presumably produce similar positive effects in 
other industries as well.
384
 For example, law firms would surely invest more in training if 
lawyers could not freely change employers. As a result, lawyers would become more 
skillful, and consumers would have access to higher quality services. If restrictions similar 
to Article 17 RSTP are not acceptable in other industries, then the question is what makes 
sport so different. 
Sport has a unique socio-educational function, but it is not immediately apparent how this 
function would be undermined if clubs were to invest less in the training of young 
professional players. For professional players themselves, football is a job. On the other 
hand, for spectators, football provides entertainment, but one must wonder what sort of 
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social, educational, or cultural value people derive from sitting in front of the TV and 
watching football. Instead, most of the socio-educational function of sport is performed at 
the grassroots level and relates to amateur sport.
385
 
It seems likely that grassroots level football would not be seriously affected even if Article 
17 RSTP were to be abolished. Grassroots level sport is not funded by profits trickled 
down from professional sports but by households, local authorities, and national 
governments.
386
 Moreover, the abolition of Article 17 RSTP cannot really discourage clubs 
from investing in the training of amateur players, as Article 17 RSTP does not even apply 
to amateur players in the first place.  
It is also worth pondering what mandate FIFA and the clubs have that allows them to adopt 
rules that deny players rights that other employees have. The autonomy of sport argument 
cannot be used to deflect all criticism of this nature. Article 17 RSTP mostly serves the 
clubs’ economic interests even if it also pursues public policy objectives at the same time. 
Restrictions as severe as Article 17 RSTP would be easier to digest if they were adopted by 
the democratically elected governments of the Member States or as a result of collective 
bargaining between workers and employers.
387
 
Finally, there is one further problem with Article 17 RSTP. Nowadays, the ECJ places 
great emphasis on good governance when applying the proportionality test.
388
 For 
example, in SIAT, the restriction was disproportionate on the grounds that it did not meet 
“the requirements of the principle of legal certainty, in accordance with which rules of law 
must be clear, precise and predictable as regards their effects, in particular where they may 
have unfavorable consequences for individuals and undertakings.”389 Moreover, in 
Bernard, the ECJ criticized the fact that training compensation was not calculated based on 
pre-determined criteria.
390
 
The CAS applies Article 17 RSTP in a way that is clearly incompatible with the principle 
of legal certainty. Compensation is calculated based on the positive interest principle, but 
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the RSTP makes no mention of such a principle.
391
 Likewise, compensation is not 
calculated in a consistent manner, as demonstrated by the differences between Matuzalem 
and De Sanctis. 
In Matuzalem, the CAS actually admitted that it calculates compensation in an 
unpredictable manner in order to deter unilateral termination.
392
 This is clearly not an 
appropriate mind-set. Applying the law in a purposefully obtuse manner is not an 
acceptable way of achieving any objective. If Article 17 RSTP is to have a deterrent or 
punitive effect, then that effect must be based on the application of clear and pre-
determined criteria.  
All in all, Article 17 RSTP is not stricto sensu proportionate in its current form and also 
fails to meet the requirements of the principle of legal certainty. Nevertheless, again, a 
protected period of one year would surely be acceptable. 
Article 20 RSTP 
It has already been established that Article 20 RSTP is neither suitable nor necessary. 
Moreover, Article 20 RSTP is clearly not proportionate stricto sensu because it only has a 
minimal effect on the recruitment and training of young players. Nonetheless, it is worth 
analyzing the issue further. 
One interesting aspect of Article 20 RSTP is that compensation is not limited to individual 
training costs but also includes global training costs. Based on Bernard, this does not 
appear to be a problem.
393
 The ECJ accepted that training compensation schemes may take 
into account “the costs borne by the clubs in training both future professional players and 
those who will never play professionally.”394 
A more serious issue is that Article 20 RSTP takes into account what it would have cost for 
the new club to train the player, or, in other words, the savings made by the new club.
395
 
This is not in line with Bernard, as compensation must be related to “the real training costs 
incurred by the club.”396 It seems obvious that savings made by the new club are not 
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related to real training costs. Some might argue that this method of calculating training 
compensation can be justified because it results in redistribution from rich to poor clubs.
397
 
However, as previously mentioned, financial solidarity can be achieved through other less 
restrictive means that are not directly related to the transfer of players. 
Another problem is that the value of the services rendered by the player is not taken into 
account.
398
 The ECJ did not touch upon this issue in Bernard, but AG Sharpston noted that 
it would seem reasonable that “the trainee should be required to ‘balance the account’, 
either by providing further services as an employee or . . . by paying equivalent 
compensation.”399 In particular, it would be quite disingenuous to claim that a player has 
not “balanced the account” if the club paid him hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
euros in salary. 
The RSTP partly addresses this issue, as no compensation is payable for costs incurred 
after the player finished his training. The problem is that compensation is still payable for 
costs incurred during the player’s training. It is submitted that the services rendered by the 
player can eventually compensate the club for these costs as well.  For example, if a player 
finishes his training at the age of 18 and continues to play for his club until the age of 22, 
then the club probably has been fully compensated. 
Moreover, it is worth questioning whether clubs should really be reimbursed for costs 
incurred in the training of very young players.  It seems unlikely that clubs in the lowest 
leagues actually spend a minimum of 10,000 euros in the training of a 12-year-old future 
professional. In reality, the training of very young players is mostly financed by local 
authorities and national governments. It is difficult to see why clubs should receive 
reimbursement for costs that they have not actually paid out of their own pockets.
400
 
Finally, the training compensation scheme seems to have been designed with elite players 
in mind. This is problematic because most professional players earn relatively modest 
salaries. For example, in 2012, the average salary for a Veikkausliiga player was only a 
little over 23,000 euros.
401
 The minimum yearly training compensation of 10,000 euros 
seems too high in comparison. In practice, it might be impossible for many young players 
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to transfer to another Member State because the value of their services is too low in 
comparison to what their new club would have to pay in training compensation.
402
 
The RSTP provides for a safety valve by stipulating that the FIFA DRC may adjust 
training compensation if it is clearly disproportionate.
403
 However, mediocre players and 
small clubs still have to take a leap of faith and hope that the FIFA DRC decides to lower 
training compensation. Proportionality does not require perfection, but some semblance of 
accuracy is required. Accordingly, Article 20 RSTP does not satisfy the requirements of 
good governance since training compensation has been set at a level that is categorically 
too high for a large number of players and clubs. 
Article 64 DC 
Article 64 DC is arguably the most problematic aspect of the current transfer system. 
Based on the Matuzalem saga, it would appear that disciplinary sanctions are imposed 
indiscriminately without consideration for the circumstances of the affected individuals. 
Even harsh sanctions might be acceptable when a debtor refuses to pay up despite having 
the means to do so. However, things are different when a debtor simply cannot afford to 
pay up. In such a situation, severe sanctions are counter-productive and disproportionate 
regardless of what positive effects the transfer system might have. Unilateral termination 
of contract is not so serious of an offense that offenders should be banned for life or 
relegated and thereby subjected to serious economic hardships. Moreover, Article 64 DC is 
unnecessary because CAS awards can be enforced through the New York Convention.
404
 
6.8 Fair share to consumers and elimination of competition 
Because Articles 17 and 20 RSTP are not proportionate, they cannot be justified under the 
efficiency defense. Nevertheless, for completeness’ sake, it will be briefly examined 
whether the remaining two efficiency defense criteria are satisfied.  
The first question in this context is whether consumers get a fair share of the resulting 
benefits. As mentioned before, it is difficult to gauge what net effect Article 17 RSTP has 
on consumers. Nonetheless, it is submitted that, in the long run, the harm caused by the 
fact that Article 17 RSTP strengthens the position of elite might outweigh the benefits 
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consumers derive from the increased investment in training.
405
 On the other hand, Article 
20 RSTP does not really produce any efficiencies at all, so it is pointless to discuss whether 
those almost non-existent efficiencies are passed on to consumers. 
The second question is whether competition is eliminated. It is fairly obvious that Article 
17 RSTP does not completely eliminate competition. While clubs cannot compete for 
players by offering higher salaries, they can compete for players by offering higher transfer 
fees. However, it must also be noted that competition on the supply and contest markets is 
already severely restricted even without taking into account Article 17 RSTP. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the further reduction of competition caused by Article 17 RSTP 
results in competition being eliminated within the meaning the efficiency defense.
406
 In 
contrast, Article 20 RSTP is a relatively minor restriction, and it seems obvious that it does 
not eliminate competition to a substantial degree.  
7 Conclusions 
In conclusion, FIFA’s rules on contractual stability and training compensation are not 
compatible with EU free movement and competition law. In particular, they infringe both 
Articles 45 and 101 TFEU. Article 102 TFEU might also be applicable, but it is impossible 
to make any definitive conclusions without more information. 
Articles 17 and 20 RSTP restrict the free movement of workers because the obligation to 
pay a sum of money and the threat of sporting sanctions deter players from pursuing 
employment in other Member States. On the other hand, competition between clubs is 
restricted because clubs are prevented from freely singing on players. As a result, clubs are 
also hindered from improving their sporting performance and from exploiting that 
performance. In addition, the transfer system favors elite clubs. Therefore, it could be 
argued that elite clubs are abusing their dominant position. However, it remains uncertain 
whether elite clubs are really dominant and whether they have acted unilaterally or merely 
colluded together with the other clubs. 
The contested rules are neither purely sporting nor inherent. Therefore, they must be 
justified under the imperative requirements doctrine and the efficiency defense. The rules 
pursue legitimate objectives and produce efficiencies in the form of financial solidarity, 
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increased investment in the training of young players, and team stability. The problem is 
that that the rules are not proportionate. 
Article 17 RSTP is problematic due to a plethora of reasons. First of all, internal taxation 
would be a more suitable and less restrictive means of achieving financial solidarity. In 
addition, a protected period of just one year – not two or three – would guarantee sufficient 
team stability. The argument that enforceable long-term contracts encourage clubs to invest 
in training has more merit but must be ultimately rejected. Under the current transfer 
system, some players are completely robbed of their right to free movement, and small 
clubs in particular are severely hindered from improving their sporting performance. 
Furthermore, the CAS applies Article 17 RSTP in a way that fails to meet the requirements 
of the principle of legal certainty. Compensation is calculated in a manner that is 
purposefully obtuse and not based on pre-determined criteria. 
On the other hand, the fundamental problem with Article 20 RSTP is that the training 
compensation scheme is currently poorly enforced and thereby incapable of really 
encouraging the recruitment and training of young players. Moreover, internal taxation 
would be a less restrictive alternative in this context as well. FIFA’s training compensation 
scheme is also indirectly discriminatory in so far as national schemes provide for lower 
training compensation. One final issue is that compensation is not limited to real training 
costs and is categorically too high for small clubs and mediocre players.  
The best way forward would probably be for clubs and players to engage in social 
dialogue. The Commission is an eager advocate of social dialogue in the sports sectors, and 
Article 165 TFEU also encourages “cooperation between bodies responsible for sports.”407 
The Commission defines social dialogue as “the discussions, consultations, negotiations 
and joint actions that regularly take place between such social partners as employers and 
trade unions.”408 According to Article 155 TFEU, social partners may conclude collective 
agreements, and the content of those agreements may even be given legal force in the form 
of a Council decision.  
In particular, the parties could agree on what kind of termination clauses may be inserted 
into player contracts. In addition, the parties could devise a new training compensation 
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scheme that is not indirectly discriminatory and more closely related to real training 
costs.
409
 The parties would probably find it very difficult to agree on anything, but there is 
some hope since social dialogue has already seen some limited success in professional 
football.
410
 
In principle, rules adopted through social dialogue are not automatically impervious to 
challenge. Unlike under competition law, there is no collective bargaining exception under 
free movement law.
411
 Be that as it may, rules that have been agreed upon by both parties 
are much easier to digest than rules that have been dictated by the stronger party. 
All in all, change seems inevitable, for FIFPro has a strong case in its hands. The 
Commission has sat on FIFPro’s complaint for over a year, which implies that the 
Commission might have some issues with the current transfer system.
412
 Moreover, it is 
difficult to see the ECJ giving its blessing to the transfer system unless it decides to depart 
from previous case law. Finally, it is good to remember that Bosman did not destroy 
professional football. It seems likely that a “new Bosman” will not do so either. 
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